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Abstract 
 
On  the  evening  of  November  8th,  2016,  Prime  Minister  Narendra  Modi  announced  to  a 
shocked  India  that  the  two  most  common  banknotes  would  thereafter  cease  to  be  legal  tender. 
Newly  designed  notes  were  printed  and  dispersed  to  Indians  who  were  forced  to  wait  in  long 
bank  and  ATM  lines,  which  frequently  ran  out  of  cash  due  to  such  high  demand.  There  were 
reports  of  people  dying  in  lines,  not  getting  paid  their  salaries  due  to  the  chaos,  and  losing 
everything  in  the  resulting  inflation  that  plagued  rural  farmers.  Since  then,  India  has  seen  a  rise 
in  cash  usage  rates  compared  to  pre-demonetization  levels,  coupled  with  a  loss  of  precious  GDP 
and  growth  rates.  On  the  flip  side  of  the  demonetization  coin  lies  Sweden,  the  most  cashless 
society  in  the  world,  whose  long  transition  to  predominantly  digital  payment  methods  has  been 
accepted  by  most  people.  Many  factors  separate  India’s  demonetization  from  Sweden’s.  To 
analyze  and  compare  these  two  countries  that  underwent  demonetization  efforts,  their  cultural 
factors,  such  as  uncertainty  avoidance,  preference  for  cash,  jugaad,  and  political  culture  must  be 
studied  in  addition  to  the  economic  factors  of  the  origin  of  change  and  income  inequality.  This 
study  shows  that  both  cultural  and  economic  factors  contributed  heavily  to  the  origins  and 
impacts  of  demonetization  events  in  India  and  Sweden.  
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I.   Introduction 
Cash  is  inarguably  one  of  the  most  important  elements  of  an  economy,  but  what  happens 
when  a  country  reduces  or  nearly  eliminates  the  use  of  cash  notes?  Both  India  and  Sweden  have 
demonetized  to  varying  degrees.  India,  in  a  government-led  initiative,  attempted  to  demonetize 
in  November  2016  when  Prime  Minister  Modi  surprisingly  announced  that  the  500  rupee  note 
and  the  1000  rupee  note  were  no  longer  legal  tender.  This  resulted  in  deaths  while  citizens  waited 
in  long  bank  lines,  a  Reserve  Bank  which  was  busy  printing  newly  designed  bills  and  retrofitting 
of  ATMS  for  new  bills,  loss  of  GDP,  and  an  ironic  rise  in  levels  of  cash  use  once  the  initial  shock 
of  demonetization  lessened.  In  contrast,  Sweden’s  demonetization  has  been  more  organic  and 
market-driven,  and  has  resulted  in  the  most  cashless  society  in  the  world.  Many  Swedes  rely 
heavily  on  app  payments  and  credit  or  debit  cards,  hereafter  referred  to  as  digital  payment 
methods,  to  complete  transactions.  The  transition  has  been  slow  and  easily  accepted  by  Swedes, 
who  rarely  pay  cash  even  for  the  smallest,  everyday  purchase. 
Both  Sweden  and  India  underwent  a  period  of  demonetization,  albeit  with  extremely 
different  results.  The  circumstances  surrounding  each  country’s  demonetization  efforts  were 
different,  and  this  has  contributed  to  one  country’s  successful  demonetization  and  another 
country’s  lack  of  success.  The  differences  between  Sweden  and  India’s  demonetization  efforts 
can  be  divided  into  cultural  factors  and  economic  factors.  The  cultural  factors  include  uncertainty 
avoidance,  jugaad,  preference  for  cash  and  political  culture.  Economic  factors  include  the  origin 
of  change  and  income  inequality.  These  variables  are  a  result  of  reading  a  myriad  of  articles  on 
these  topics  and  creating  connections  between  the  two  events.  This  is  a  work  of  comparative 
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political  economy  that  also  examines  how  non-state  transnational  actors,  such  as  multilateral  aid 
agencies  and  philanthropic  organizations,  contributed  to  demonetization  in  India  and  Sweden.  
The  justification  for  choosing  India  and  Sweden  for  this  comparative  case  study  of  two 
economies  is  twofold.  First,  India  and  Sweden  are  examples  which  do  not  seem  to  overlap  in 
reasons  for  demonetization,  implementation,  or  outcomes.  These  are  two  diverse  cases  using  the 
criteria  suggested  by  Seawright  and  Gerring  (2008).  Diverse  cases  are  chosen  with  the  objective 
of  achieving  the  most  variation  between  cases  (Seawright  &  Gerring,  2008,  p.  300) .  India  and 
Sweden  show  a  full  range  of  variation  on  both  cultural  and  economic  dimensions  that  contributed 
to  the  causes  and  effects  of  demonetization.  These  cases  are  categorical  and  allow  for  easy 
identification  of  diversity  (Seawright  &  Gerring,  2008,  p.  297) .  More  coherent  conclusions  can 
be  made  to  study  the  origins  and  implications  of  demonetization.  Studying  these  cases  also 
contributes  to  the  goal  of  creating  more  successful  demonetizations  in  the  future.  
Second,  other  instances  of  demonetization  were  enacted  to  reduce  inflation  or  a  result  of 
a  crumbling  union,  as  in  post-Soviet  Russia,  or  the  result  or  a  new  burgeoning  union,  as  in  the 
European  Union.  India’s  push  for  demonetization  came  from  the  top  while  Sweden’s  came  as  a 
result  of  the  market  gradually  preferring  digital  payment  methods.  India’s  case  of  demonetization 
has  greatly  affected  the  economy  and  people’s  everyday  lives.  Swedes,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
integrated  digital  payments  into  nearly  all  facets  of  their  economy  with  great  success.  These 
cases  are  unique  in  terms  of  demonetization. 
The  relationship  between  India  and  Sweden  in  terms  of  demonetization  is  extremely 
complex.  While  both  underwent  demonetization,  the  origins  and  impacts  of  the  events  were 
vastly  different  due  to  a  variety  of  factors.  These  cultural  and  economic  factors  allow  for 
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comparisons  to  be  made  between  the  two  countries  and  demonetization  events.  Comparing  the 
demonetization  events  in  India  and  Sweden  is  important  because  these  cases  provide  roadmaps 
for  what  not  to  do  in  future  demonetization  attempts,  as  well  as  guidelines  as  to  what  is  required 
for  a  successful  demonetization.  Both  efforts  left  some  citizens  behind,  though  India’s  was  far 
more  disastrous  than  Sweden’s.  By  looking  deeply  into  the  cultural  and  economic  factors  that 
both  contributed  to  the  origins  and  impacts  of  demonetization,  a  clearer  understanding  of  the 
causes  and  effects  are  laid  out  and  can  be  applied  to  future  attempts.  This  paper  answers  several 
questions:  why  demonetization  was  attempted  in  both  countries,  the  initiatives  themselves,  and 
what  were  the  socio-economic  impacts  that  contributed  to  the  removal  of  cash  from  circulation  in 
both  countries  and  its  impact.  Additionally,  the  main  question  answered  pertains  to  why 
Sweden’s  demonetization  was  successful  while  India’s  was  not 
1. What  is  demonetization? 
Demonetization  is  the  process  in  which  monetary  bills  are  taken  out  of  circulation  and 
replaced  with  different  notes  or  other  forms  of  payment.  In  the  case  of  India,  the  500  rupee  and 
100  rupee  notes,  86.4%  of  India’s  currency  (Mohindra  &  Mukherjee,  2018,  p.  483) ,  were 
replaced  with  a  newly  designed  1000  rupee  note  and  a  new  2000  rupee  note.  In  the  case  of 
Sweden,  bills  gradually  decreased  in  popularity  and  were  slowly  replaced  by  mobile  payment 
platforms.  The  country  did  revamp  its  currency  and  recall  old  notes,  but  this  was  to  update 
security  features  and  make  physical  currency  more  environmentally  friendly. 
The  reasons  behind  demonetization  vary  depending  on  a  country’s  situation.  It  can  be  a 
market-based  movement  away  from  cash  or  an  effort  to  combat  tax  evasion,  cash  used  for 
terrorism,  counterfeit  money,  so-called  “black  money”  by  Narendra  Modi,  and  to  reduce  crime. 
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By  recalling  notes  and  replacing  them  with  new  designs,  rates  of  taxation  could  increase  and  new 
security  features  could  be  added  to  prevent  counterfeiting.  Demonetization  also  can  be  an  effort 
to  introduce  cash-heavy  societies  to  traditional  bank  accounts  and  banking  systems.  
Demonetization  transpired  in  the  European  Union,  when  governments  fixed  exchange 
rates  and  demonetized  old  currencies  before  adopting  the  Euro.  It  also  occurred  in  post-Soviet 
nations,  in  Zimbabwe  in  2015  to  control  hyperinflation,  and  the  United  Kingdom  to  varying 
degrees  of  success.  In  countries  which  underwent  rapid  demonetization,  such  as  Zimbabwe, 
Ghana,  and  Myanmar,  the  goal  was  generally  to  fight  hyperinflation.  As  a  result  of  this  quick 
process  without  a  stable  government  and  a  lack  of  infrastructure,  riots  and  deaths  occurred,  and 
Ghana  in  particular  had  a  major  economic  downturn  (Bose,  2019,  p.  39) . 
Some  demonetization  attempts  were  due  to  the  introduction  of  completely  new 
currencies,  like  the  Euro  or  the  variety  of  post-Soviet  nation  currencies,  or  to  combat  various 
economic  issues,  such  as  low  rates  of  taxation,  counterfeit  money,  or  an  attempt  to  transition  to 
digital  means  of  payment.  In  some  countries,  this  transition  has  been  more  organically  controlled 
by  the  people  or  the  market.  In  others,  it  has  been  a  government  initiative  forced  on  to  the 
people.  In  the  end,  demonetization  radically  affects  an  economy  and  its  participants.  
II.  India 
India  is  no  stranger  to  demonetization;  it  first  had  a  currency  ban  just  prior  to 
independence  in  1946  and  another  in  1978  (S.  Goel,  2018,  p.  494) .  In  1946,  the  focus  was  on 
capturing  tax  revenue  from  avoiders  by  targeting  the  Rs5000  and  Rs10,000  notes,  huge  sums  that 
could  only  be  obtained  by  the  wealthy  at  that  time.  In  1978,  the  focus  was  on  targeting  black 
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money;  thus,  the  Rs1000,  Rs5000,  and  Rs10,000  notes  were  removed  from  circulation  (Bose, 
2019,  p.  38) . 
India  is  primarily  a  cash-based  economy,  with  only  2-3%  of  expenses  paid  electronically . 
In  a  small  study,  nine  out  of  ten  transactions  at  malls  were  made  with  cash  (Sharma  & 
Fernandez,  2018,  p.  15) ,  reflecting  the  fact  that  90%  of  transactions  in  general  are  cash-based 
(Mohindra  &  Mukherjee,  2018,  p.  486) .  India  itself  is  a  post-colonial  country  struggling  to 
maintain  its  rapid  economic  growth  and  democratic  processes  coupled  with  intense  population 
growth.  Demonetization  talks  prior  to  Modi’s  announcement  could  have  gone  both  ways,  they 
could  have  either  helped  or  hindered  the  burgeoning  economic  giant,  depending  on  how  the 
initiative  was  planned  and  executed.  
Demonetization  in  India  could  have  had  the  potential  to  improve  lives,  lower  costs,  and 
save  money  and  time.  By  moving  towards  digital  payments  and  credit  or  debit  card  use,  India  as 
a  whole  could  have  saved  man  hours  at  banks  and  servicing  ATMs.  There  would  have  been 
fewer  lines,  money  could  have  been  changed  or  transferred  faster,  and  banks  and  ATMs  would 
not  have  run  out  of  cash.  A  cashless  economy  could  have  reportedly  saved  India  .25%  of  its  GDP 
(Sharma  &  Fernandez,  2018,  p.  16) .  As  a  populus  hub  of  technology,  India  does  have  the 
manpower  and  knowledge  to  create  and  implement  a  more  extensive  non-cash  based  system. 
However,  there  are  issues  limiting  proper  and  full  implementation  of  demonetization,  the  most 
stark  being  that  a  large  portion  of  the  population  does  not  have  access  to  banking  institutions  due 
to  the  fact  that  they  live  in  rural  areas.  Regardless,  this  did  not  stop  a  largely  ill-planned 
demonetization  from  being  announced.  
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On  November  8th,  2016  around  9  PM,  Indian  Prime  Minister  Narendra  Modi  announced 
to  a  surprised  India  that  at  midnight,  the  500  rupee  note  and  the  1000  rupee  note  would  cease  to 
be  legal  tender.  In  an  initiative  called  notebandi  in  Hindi,  a  new  500  rupee  bill  would  be 
designed  in  addition  to  the  introduction  of  a  completely  new  2000  rupee  note.  In  Modi’s  words, 
the  demonetization  effort  was  aimed  “t o  break  the  grip  of  corruption  and  black  money”  and  to 
combat  the  hawala  system,  a  traditional  financial  system  involving  cash  brokers  and  connections 
(Jost  &  Sandhu,  2000,  p.  8)  often  used  by  extremist  groups  (Jain,  2016) .  Black  money  was  and  is 
a  term  used  by  Modi  to  allude  to  cash  used  by  terrorists  or  for  criminal  purposes  that  has  avoided 
tax  collection  (Mohindra  &  Mukherjee,  2018,  p.  483) .  Subsequently,  ATMs  around  the  country 
would  be  closed  on  November  9th  and  November  10th  in  order  to  retrofit  the  machines  to  fit  new 
bills  and  eliminate  the  Rs1000  space  (Srivas,  2016) .  The  Reserve  Bank  of  India  spent  Rs79.65 
billion  printing  the  new  Rs500  and  Rs2000  notes  (Sharma  &  Fernandez,  2018,  p.  23) . 
1. The  Days  Before  Demonetization  and  Interests  in  India’s  Demonetization 
Interestingly,  the  days  before  demonetization  were  neither  a  flurry  of  preparedness,  nor 
were  they  full  of  coordination  across  various  Indian  agencies  in  order  to  roll  out  the  new  policy 
to  India’s  vast  population,  for  whom  98%  of  transactions  are  completed  in  cash,  or  a  whopping 
68%  of  the  total  value  of  transactions  (Jain,  2016) .  Rather,  in  the  days  before  the  implementation 
of  Modi’s  demonetization  plan  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India  (hereafter  RBI)  was  printing  massive 
amounts  of  Rs500  and  Rs1000  notes  that  would  be  discontinued  in  the  coming  days.  On 
November  4th,  2016,  currency  in  circulation  had  increased  to  17,970  billion  rupees  from  13,715 
billion  rupees,  or  31%,  since  Narendra  Modi’s  Bharatiya  Janata  Party  (BJP)  government  assumed 
office  (Sharma  &  Fernandez,  2018,  p.  22) .  The  opposition  to  the  BJP  was  not  silent  about  their 
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shock.  Congress  Party  leader  Palaniappan  Chidambaram,  also  a  former  finance  minister,  stated 
that  in  meetings  with  the  RBI  days  before  the  demonetization  decree,  demonetization  was  not 
mentioned,  nor  were  designs  of  new  notes  or  plans  for  the  initiative  drawn  up.  In  addition, 
Chidambaram  indicated  that  the  RBI  rejected  two  justifications  of  demonetization,  curbing 
so-called  black  money  and  counterfeiting,  but  approved  the  decision  just  two  hours  before  it  was 
announced  (“Demonetisation:Congress  says  RBI  meeting  minutes  proves  bank’s  disapproval  of 
decision”,  2019) .  Economist  and  philosopher  Amartya  Sen,  often  critical  of  Narendra  Modi, 
stated  that  demonetization  was  a  despotic  act  which  “undermines  notes”,  “undermines  bank 
accounts”,  and  “undermines  the  entire  economy  of  trust”.  He  also  claimed  the  government  was 
breaking  promises  to  the  people  through  this  act  (PTI,  2016) . 
Many  parties  internal  and  external  to  India  have  been  interested  in  converting  the  country 
from  a  cash-based  society  to  one  that  relies  mostly  on  cards  or  payment  apps.  In  India,  those  who 
benefit  from  a  cashless  system  are  Indian  companies  that  benefit  from  digital  payments  like 
Airtel  and  Paytm,  the  latter  of  which  saw  growth  rise  18%  in  smaller  towns  following 
demonetization.  Larger  retail  chains  with  better  access  to  digital  infrastructure  benefitted  over 
small  cash-based  stores .  Big  corporate  farming  entities  benefitted  from  small  farmers  selling 
their  land  and  livestock  in  response  to  a  loss  of  individual  capital  (Bose,  2019,  p.  41) . 
The  United  States  and  US-based  organizations  have  significant  interest  in 
demonetization.  The  BTCA,  the  Better  Than  Cash  Alliance  formed  in  2012,  is  a  group 
comprising  governments,  companies,  and  international  organizations  that  try  to  hasten  the 
transition  to  digital  payments  to  improve  lives  by  reducing  poverty.  Members  include  prominent 
organizations  and  companies  such  as  USAID,  Visa,  MasterCard,  and  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates 
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Foundation  (Bose,  2019,  p.  40).  They  are  headquartered  in  the  United  Nations  and  intend  to 
grow  digital  payment  systems  without  preference  to  a  specific  company  or  interface.  This  is  all 
under  the  goal  of  creating  more  inclusive  spaces  for  business  by  opening  up  informal  financial 
spaces  to  women,  rural  communities,  and  the  poor.  Other  claims  are  that  exclusively  digital 
payments  may  help  curb  violence  and  provide  more  transparency  and  security,  save  money,  and 
promote  financial  inclusion  (Better  Than  Cash  Alliance,  n.d. ).   Despite  these  intentions,  there  is 
little  proof  that  demonetizing  helps  open  up  informal  spaces  for  the  underprivileged,  and  claims 
of  no  bias  toward  companies  or  interfaces  will  find  it  hard  to  be  accepted  when  promoted  by  two 
giants  in  the  credit  card  world.  
The  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation  is  often  mentioned  when  reading  about 
demonetization  efforts  around  the  world.  In  2015,  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation’s  goal 
was  to  implement  a  fully  digital  payment  system  in  India  and  other  developing  countries  by 
2018.  At  a  2015  forum  in  Washington,  D.C.  organized  by  the  U.S.  Treasury  Department  and 
USAID,  Bill  Gates  remarked  that  “Full  digitalization  of  the  economy  may  happen  in  developing 
countries  faster  than  anywhere  else...We  have  very  significant  efforts  in  Nigeria,  Pakistan  and 
India,  (and)  a  dozen  other  countries,  where  we  work  with  the  central  banks  to  make  sure  that  the 
right  kind  of  transaction  switch  is  available”  (Financial  Inclusion  Forum,  2015,  pt.  17:23) , 
clearly  showing  the  goals  of  the  Foundation  as  well  as  a  close  relationship  with  Reserve  Bank  of 
India.  In  the  same  speech,  he  stated  that  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation  worked  with  the 
RBI  over  three  years  to  create  a  new  type  of  payments  bank  though  which  customers  would  be 
able  to  use  their  mobile  phones  for  basic  financial  transactions.  
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Two  years  prior,  in  201 3,  Raghuram  Rajan  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  became 
the  Governor  of  the  RBI.  He  set  up  the  Mor  Commission,  headed  by  Nachiket  Mor,  to  address 
issues  of  financial  inclusion  in  India’s  poor  and  rural  areas.  US-based  groups  linked  to  the  Mor 
Commission  included  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation.  This  commission  worked  on 
getting  Indians  bank  accounts,  and  linking  them  to  the  Aadhar  identification  card  (Haering, 
2017) .  The  Aadhar  card  is  an  Indian  national  identification  card  that  uses  multiple  forms  of 
verification,  including  biometrics,  to  ensure  security.  It  has,  however,  been  subject  to  data 
breaches.  
2. Corruption:  the  Bharatiya  Janata  Party  and  Narendra  Modi 
Narendra  Modi’s  personal  brand  was  also  a  catalyst  for  demonetization.  His  own 
ideology,  and  that  of  his  political  party,  the  BJP,  is  one  of  Hindutva ,  or  Hindu  nationalism.  This 
party  is  defined  by  its  Hindu  faith  and  extends  that  definition  to  the  country.  The  party  and  Modi 
are  heavily  connected  to  the  Rashtriya  Swayamsevak  Sangh  (RSS),  a  pro-Hindu  nationalist 
group  of  five  million  men.  60,000  clubs  meet  daily,  exercising  and  discussing  the  latest  political 
issues  (“Narendra  Modi  and  the  struggle  for  India’s  soul—Orange  evolution,”  2019,  p.  19) .  Since 
former  RSS-leader  Modi  entered  the  political  scene,  more  Hindutva  initiatives  have  been 
implemented,  such  as  education  reform  to  emphasize  Hindu  identity,  ending  policies  that 
advocated  for  the  equal  rights  of  Muslims,  limiting  the  role  of  Sharia  law,  repealing  special  status 
laws  toward  the  disputed  territory  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  building  Hindu  temples,  and  strongly 
defending  rules  to  protect  cows.  Even  cities  originally  named  by  Muslim  leaders  have  been 
renamed  to  sound  more  Hindu  and  traditionally  Indian  by  BJP  politicians.  For  example, 
Allahabad,  originally  named  by  Mughal  emperor  Akbar,  was  changed  to  Prayagraj. 
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Unsurprisingly,  the  Congress  Party,  usually  in  opposition  to  the  BJP,   has  adopted  these  policies 
as  well  by  diverting  money  in  the  name  of  cow  protection  and  appearing  for  publicity  at  Hindu 
temples  around  India  (“Narendra  Modi  and  the  struggle  for  India’s  soul—Orange  evolution,” 
2019,  p.  18) .  Ideas  that  were  once  marginalized  as  extreme  have  become  commonplace. 
Thus,  opposition  to  demonetization  has  become  opposition  to  the  BJP  and  Hinduism.  The 
recent  elections  in  which  the  BJP  gained  more  seats  in  the  Indian  legislative  bodies,  the  Rajya 
Sabha  and  the  Lok  Sabha,  secured  a  second  term  for  Narendra  Modi,  and  only  amplified 
Hindutva  and  support  for  Modi’s  policies.  In  terms  of  elections,  demonetization  could  have  also 
been  a  dig  at  other  political  parties.  Most  Indian  elections  are  conducted  using  cash  as  it  is 
untraceable,  meaning  the  ability  to  bribe  or  coerce  using  cash  is  feasible.  By  eliminating  cash  as 
an  option  and  raising  scrutiny  of  black  money,  Modi’s  BJP  slightly  disadvantaged  themselves  but 
mostly  their  political  competition.  Due  to  the  BJP’s  size  and  power,  they  were  able  to  allocate 
funds  in  different  ways  and  get  by  without  resorting  to  black  money,  whereas  political 
competitors  were  disadvantaged  by  demonetization.  
3. Effect  on  People 
Demonetization  was  rolled  out  on  November  8th  to  shocked  and  unprepared  Indians.  In 
the  capital,  New  Delhi,  the  Rapid  Action  Force,  or  RAF,  was  deployed  to  manage  crowds 
(Srivas,  2016) .  Further  complicating  matters  was  the  fact  that  many  Indians  lacked  formal  bank 
accounts  due  to  their  living  in  rural  areas  far  away  from  banking  institutions,  ability  to  function 
easily  without  a  bank  account,  or  the  lack  of  necessary  paperwork  required  to  open  a  banking 
account.  Between  32%  and  46%  of  Indian  adults  have  bank  accounts,  but  many  of  them  are 
empty  (Courier,  2017) .  80%  of  women  do  not  have  bank  accounts  (Courier,  2017) ,  and  as  many 
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as  93%  of  rural  areas  in  India  are  considered  ‘unbanked’,  meaning  that  those  in  rural  areas 
depend  on  banking  correspondence,  or  a  bank  that  acts  as  an  intermediary  or  broker  between 
larger  banks  and  smaller  branches.  While  the  government’s  Jan  Dhan  Yojana  initiative  provided 
bank  accounts  to  22.6  million  Indians,  many  still  did  not  have  bank  accounts,  let  alone  access  to 
them,  funds  to  deposit,  or  the  documents  to  open  them  (Sharma  &  Fernandez,  2018,  p.  18) .  Thus, 
rural  people,  women,  and  those  without  documents  were  at  a  huge  disadvantage  from  the 
beginning  of  the  initiative. 
Following  the  decree,  those  with  accounts,  ample  time,  knowledge  of  the  event,  and  bills 
to  exchange  stood  in  lines  at  banks  hundreds  of  people  long,  serviced  by  bank  workers  woefully 
unprepared  to  exchange  such  high  volumes  of  cash.  Reports  show  that  up  to  150  people  died 
waiting  in  long  lines  to  exchange  their  discontinued  notes  for  new  ones  (Sharma  &  Fernandez, 
2018,  p.  44) .  Those  who  missed  out  on  the  exchange  window  were  out  of  luck,  including  the 
elderly,  the  less  educated,  and  tribal  people.  Hoarding  of  still  legal  Rs100  notes  skyrocketed  and 
people  found  ways  around  waiting  in  lines,  often  forcing  others  to  wait  for  them.  Day  workers  in 
the  informal  sector  were  not  paid  for  long  periods  of  time.  Demonetization  may  not  have  met  its 
goal  of  finding  and  collecting  black  money:  99%  of  bills  were  returned,  signifying  a  lack  of 
counterfeit  money  floating  around  in  India  in  the  first  place  (Bose,  2019,  p.  41) .  Following  this, 
Modi’s  narrative  seems  to  have  shifted  from  curbing  corruption  and  stifling  counterfeit  bills  to 
integrating  India  into  the  modern  world  by  shifting  Indians  to  more  digital  payment  systems.  
India  was  not,  and  is  not,  infrastructurally  prepared  to  be  cashless.  Besides  the  huge 
amounts  of  people  who  primarily  use  cash,  the  statistics  associated  with  cash  use  in  India’s  rural 
areas  do  not  show  proof  of  any  ability  to  successfully  transition  to  a  demonetized  system. 
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According  to  economist  and  India  expert  Barbara  Harriss-White,  half  of  India’s  villages  do  not 
have  electricity  or  are  subject  to  power  irregularities.  Many  Indians  in  rural  areas  do  not  have 
internet  access,  despite  the  low  cost  of  internet  service,  and  thus  many  do  not  have  access  to 
mobile  banking  or  payment  applications  (Courier,  2017) .  
In  terms  of  banking,  out  of  a  population  of  1.3  billion,  there  are  740  million  debit  cards 
and  27  million  credit  cards.  Many  of  these  cards  lie  dormant  or  are  used  sporadically  for  small 
purchases  (Courier,  2017) .  Another  essential  yet  often  overlooked  element  of  banking  was 
India’s  ATM  system.  75%  of  India’s  ATMs  are  in  metropolitan  areas  and  rural  areas  vary  in  ATM 
density.  ATMs  in  rural  areas  are  often  faulty  due  to  a  lack  of  repair  and  therefore  can  not  be 
trusted.  In  May  2016,  months  prior  to  demonetization,  the  RBI  stated  that  out  of  a  survey  of 
4,000  ATMs  in  India,  “almost  1/3rd  of  the  ATMs  were  found  to  be  not  working”  (Srivas,  2016 ). 
Post-demonetization  ATMs  required  retrofitting  due  to  the  change  in  physical  size  between  the 
old  notes  and  the  new.  On  November  9th  and  10th,  210,000  ATMs  holding  17  billion  rupees 
worth  of  notes  were  serviced  by  a  mere  35,000  workers  all  over  India.  However,  demand  was 
much  higher  than  supply,  and  the  ATMs  constantly  ran  out  of  bills.  Further  delaying  the  process, 
a  three-month  period  following  the  demonetization  announcement  occurred  as  India  waited  for 
new  notes  to  be  printed  (Ghoshal,  2017).  
The  Indian  government  layered  another  inconvenience,  later  made  a  loophole,  on  the 
people:  the  maximum  amount  of  rupees  an  individual  could  trade  was  Rs4,000,  just  over 
$550USD  at  the  time  of  writing.  To  get  around  this,  people  used  “money  mules”,  or  agents  who 
stood  in  line  to  change  over  small  amounts  to  avoid  suspicion  by  bank  workers  ( Mohindra  & 
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Mukherjee,  2018,  p.  488) .  Policies  were  changed  often  as  new  problems  arose  or  as  loopholes 
were  discovered  and  corrected.  
As  a  result  of  demonetization,  Indians  experienced  a  decline  in  health  care.  Many  opted 
out,  delayed,  or  simply  went  without  medical  care  due  to  rationing  money,  a  total  lack  of  money, 
or  not  getting  paid  on  time.  Additionally,  many  experienced  increased  stress  due  to  the  chaos  that 
followed  notebandi,  with  some  committing  suicide  as  a  result  of  higher  food  prices  and  other 
factors  that  contributed  to  a  total  loss  of  finances.  The  poor  and  those  working  in  informal 
sectors,  often  lower  educated  or  lower  caste,  were  the  most  affected,  as  they  were  more 
dependent  on  their  wages  being  paid  in  cash,  which  was  hard  for  employers  to  disperse  following 
the  announcement.  Food  consumption  decreased  as  prices  of  food  rose.  Women,  who  often  keep 
a  bit  of  cash  stashed  away  for  emergency,  were  especially  harmed,  as  they  had  to  give  up  their 
hidden  money  or  the  money  they  had  saved  was  suddenly  worthless  (Mohindra  &  Mukherjee 
2018,  p.  489) .  Responsibility  often  fell  to  employers  at  this  time,  who  were  told  to  open  bank 
accounts  for  their  staff  and  train  them  in  using  electronic  wallets,  putting  even  more  pressure  on 
workers  to  train  other  citizens  or  learn  entirely  new  ways  of  buying  things  (Banerji,  2016) .  
The  cash  flow  to  workers  in  migrant  or  low-skilled  jobs  was  restricted  by  the  unmet 
demand  for  replacement  notes  and  some  industries  could  have  been  eliminated.  Other  areas 
affected  were  transportation,  since  highway  toll  operators  refused  to  accept  old  banknotes, 
choking  flows  of  traffic  across  the  country,  and  agriculture,  which  is  generally  affected  by  any 
economic  turmoil.  All  aspects  of  agricultural  sales  are  cash-dependent,  from  the  purchase  of 
seeds  to  the  transport  to  markets,thus  making  it  vulnerable  to  changes  in  currency  (Sharma  & 
Fernandez,  2018,  p.  28 ).  These  are  just  some  of  the  problems  on  a  sectoral  level.  
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4. Effect  on  the  Indian  Economy  
Prior  to  the  demonetization  announcement,  India’s  GDP  growth  was  at  a  high  of  8.15%  in 
2015.  By  2016,  it  dropped  one  percent  to  7.11%  and  further  dropped  to  6.11%  in  2017  (The 
World  Bank,  2019) .  This  was  likely  a  result  of  demonetization.  
While  demonetization  efforts  were  initiated  to  expel  black  money,  this  effort  was  largely 
unachieved.  People  most  hurt  were  those  in  small  businesses  or  employers;  however,  these 
people  were  also  the  first  to  offer  credit  to  fellow  citizens  after  the  demonetization  crisis.  Those 
who  had  large  amounts  of  black  money  were  presumably  knowledgeable  in  how  to  transfer  this 
money  to  offshore  banking  accounts.  In  fact,  large  amounts  of  bills  were  returned  to  the  RBI, 
suggesting  that  demonetization  as  a  way  to  combat  black  money  may  not  have  been  the  true 
motive.  
With  eerie  accuracy,  former  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  offered  some  predictions 
about  demonetization  that  later  proved  prophetic.  A  former  economist,  Singh  suggested  that 
demonetization  would  harm  agricultural  growth  and  negatively  affect  small  industry  and  the 
informal  sectors  of  the  economy.  He  predicted  that  GDP  growth  would  decline  by  2%.  He 
ultimately  stated  that  demonetization  was  “organized  loot  and  legalized  plunder”  ( “”,  2016) . 
The  government  did  report  success,  however,  in  a  series  of  seven  points.  The  tax  base 
was  increased  by  17.3%,  which  would  now  provide  India  with  more  funding.  The  collection  of 
advance  tax  grew  by  41.79%,  a  success  since  the  Modi  government  claimed  that  $10  billion  in 
unpaid  income  tax  was  due  by  2016  (Anand  &  Kumar,  2016) .  The  cash  to  GDP  ratio  fell,  which 
may  hint  at  the  success  of  digital  payments,  though  this  would  prove  false  as  the  cash  use  rate 
became  higher  post-demonetization.  Investigations  were  launched  into  people  with  high  value 
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properties  who  had  not  paid  their  income  tax,  shell  companies,  and  properties  under  which  the 
registered  name  is  not  the  beneficiary.  The  government  also  said  that  it  was  looking  into  those 
who  deposited  over  Rs200,000  during  the  demonetization  adjustment  period  over  concerns  that 
such  amounts  signal  black  money  (Bose,  2019,  p.  45) .  According  to  Sharma  and  Fernandez,  the 
stock  market  was  negatively  affected  as  well.  The  BSE  SENSEX  went  down  1,689  points,  while 
the  NIFTY  50  decreased  by  541  points  (Chandrakar,  2017,  p.  117) . 
In  mid-November  2016,  the  Modi  government  released  a  survey  regarding  attitudes 
towards  the  demonetization  effort.  There  was  a  catch,  however;  the  survey  was  only  accessible 
via  smartphone  on  the  Narendra  Modi  App.  Questions  were  asked  about  a  range  of  issues 
pertaining  to  demonetization,  such  as  whether  or  not  it  was  beneficial  and  to  whom.  Survey 
takers  could  not  answer  with  any  disagreeing  statements,  as  the  survey  items  did  not  allow  for 
such  responses.  Unsurprisingly,  the  results  of  the  survey  showed  overwhelming  support  for 
demonetization,  which  the  Prime  Minister  used  to  validate  the  program  and  congratulate  himself 
on  a  job  well  done,  saying  that  92%  of  people  who  took  the  survey  supported  his  efforts.  The 
survey  was  absolutely  a  farce  considering  that  it  targeted  a  tiny  percent  of  India’s  population: 
those  with  access  to  smartphones,  so  only  about  17%  of  Indians,  those  with  adequate  digital 
literacy  to  download  and  use  apps,  and  those  who  feel  the  need  to  download  the  Prime  Minister’s 
app  in  the  first  place.  From  his  survey,  it  is  clear  that  among  wealthier,  digitally-literate  BJP  or 
Modi  supporters,  approval  for  demonetization  runs  high   (Daniyal,  2016) . 
Today,  only  a  few  years  later,  large  withdrawals  and  deposits  of  cash  must  be  explained 
by  bank  customers.  Cash  transactions  of  over  Rs  200,000  have  been  made  illegal,  and  any  cash 
transaction  over  Rs  50,000  requires  the  government-issued  ID  card,  the  Aadhar  card. 
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Additionally,  there  is  discussion  of  whether  or  not  to  look  into  trading  of  other  assets  like  gold 
(Bose,  2019,  p.  44) .  
In  a  speech  that  reflected  the  most  recent  views  of  demonetization  and  echoed  his  past 
views,  former  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  stated  on  September  1st,  2019  that 
demonetization  as  a  policy  was  “all-round  mismanagement”.  He  worried  about  the  slowing 
economy  and  GDP  despite  India’s  potential  to  grow  faster.  Singh  cited  certain  worrying 
statistics:  the  manufacturing  sector’s  growth  had  slowed  to  0.6%,  consumption  was  at  an 
18-month  low,  and  GDP  growth  was  at  a  15  year  low.  Jobs  were  lost  in  the  automobile  sector 
and,  while  there  are  not  hard  statistics  to  back  it  up,  the  informal  sector  must  also  be  facing 
joblessness.  Taxes  are  still  not  being  paid.  Singh  states  that  “rural  India  is  in  terrible  shape”  as 
prices  and  incomes  for  farmers  have  decreased,  while  a  low  inflation  rate  hurts  farmers  as  well. 
Interestingly,  Singh  mentioned  that  the  autonomy  of  the  RBI  has  deteriorated  and  confidence  in 
the  Indian  economy  has  been  shaken.  He  closed  with  a  call  to  action  for  the  Modi  government: 
“Our  youth,  our  farmers  and  our  farm  workers,  entrepreneurs,  and  the  marginalised  section 
deserve  better.  India  cannot  afford  to  continue  down  this  path.  Therefore,  I  urge  the  Government 
to  put  aside  vendetta  politics  and  reach  out  to  all  sane  voices  and  thinking  minds  to  steer  our 
economy  out  of  this  man-made  crisis”  (ET  Online,  2019) . 
Why  did  India  undergo  demonetization  when  the  benefits  have  not  been  as  clear  cut  as 
they  were  made  out  to  be?  Clearly,  international  interest  in  creating  a  cashless  India,  whether 
philanthropic,  capitalist,  or  both,  was  a  catalyst.  Domestic  issues,  such  as  Modi’s  Hindutva 
policies  and  need  for  control  over  India  and  Indian  politics,  played  a  role  as  well.  India’s 
demonetization  was  a  government  effort  from  the  very  top  pushed  on  a  population  and  that  was 
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not  remotely  prepared  for  the  massive  upset  it  would  cause  to  their  lives.  The  repercussions  of 
such  a  political  act  are  still  rippling  to  this  day,  and  they  will  for  years  to  come.  India  may  never 
recover  from  an  effort  that  was  alleged  to  be  a  minor  inconvenience  for  the  greater  good,  but  has 
not  lived  up  to  expectations  for  the  majority  of  Indians.  Compared  to  Sweden’s  experience,  the 
difference  is  stark.  
III.  Sweden 
Sweden  is  the  world’s  pilot  program  when  it  comes  to  cashlessness,  due  to  its  high  trust 
in  the  government,  a  history  of  technological  advances,  and  popular  acceptance  of  those 
technological  advances.  The  Nordic  country’s  demonetization  journey  has  been  slow  and  steady, 
initially  dominated  by  innovation  extending  to  the  market  and  laypeople,  then  via  policies 
adopted  by  the  Swedish  government  for  the  banking  sector.  That  being  said,  there  are  societal 
costs  to  cashlessness  that  have  prevented  Sweden  from  completely  converting  to  a  cashless 
society,  though  that  is  a  future  that  does  not  seem  so  far  away.  
Sweden  is  the  closest  example  the  world  has  today  to  a  nearly  completely  cashless 
society,  though  it  was  the  first  country  in  Europe  to  introduce  notes  in  1661  (Russell,  2014) . 
Swedish  busses  do  not  accept  cash,  nor  can  one  buy  a  ticket  for  the  Stockholm  metro  in  cash. 
Retailers  are  allowed  by  law  to  refuse  coins  or  notes  as  long  as  there  are  signs  near  the  entrance 
or  register  indicating  their  refusal  (Skingsley,  2018) .  Street  vendors  and  churches  prefer  to  use 
cards  or  payment  apps.  900  of  Sweden's  1,600  bank  branches  do  not  keep  cash  or  accept  cash 
deposits  and  many  do  not  have  ATMs.  Circulation  of  the  Swedish  krona  has  dramatically 
decreased  since  2009  (Henley,  2016) .  
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Today,  20%  of  consumer  payments  in  Sweden  are  made  in  cash  compared  to  about  75% 
in  the  rest  of  the  world  (Henley,  2016) ,  and  in  stark  contrast  to  India,  where  98%  of  consumer 
payments  are  made  in  cash  (Jain,  2016) .  Ph ysical  money  represents  just  1%  of  the  Swedish 
economy,  with  only  one  in  10  people  making  cash  purchases  in  2018.  Young  people  are  much 
more  likely  to  shy  away  from  cash:  upwards  of  95%  of  their  spending  paid  with  cards  or  digital 
payment  apps  (Alderman,  2018) .  According  to  the  Riksbank,  the  central  bank  of  Sweden,  less 
than  2%  of  Sweden’s  economy  is  represented  by  cash  with  that  figure  forecasted  to  drop  to  0.5% 
in  2020.  The  start  of  demonetization  in  Sweden  may  have  been  in  the  1960s  when  banks 
convinced  employers  and  workers  to  use  digital  money  transfers  for  wages.  In  the  1990s,  credit 
and  debit  card  use  was  boosted  as  many  banks  started  to  charge  for  checks  (Henley,  2016) . 
The  decline  in  cash  use  was  also  initiated  by  a  string  of  robberies  on  busses,  after  which 
bus  payments  became  digital.  Since  then,  many  banks  have  also  become  digital,  relying  less  and 
less  on  cash  or  refusing  to  deal  with  cash  in  general.  Banks  report  that  they  are  saving  money  on 
security  and  that  the  incentive  to  commit  cash  robberies  has  nearly  been  eliminated  (Savage, 
2019) .  The  data  suggest  that  cashlessness  may  make  banks  safer:  in  2008,  210  banks  were 
robbed  compared  to  2  banks  in  2017  (Alderman,  2018) .  In  a  country  like  Sweden,  the  home  of 
music  streaming  service  Spotify  and  addictive  mobile  game  Candy  Crush,  digital  payment 
application  innovation  is  easier  than  elsewhere  and  has  a  more  receptive  audience.  A  payment 
app  called  Swish  is  used  almost  everywhere  and  the  Swedish  central  bank  is  looking  into 
creating  a  new  state-issued  digital  currency  called  the  e-krona,  which  is  independent  from  Visa 
and  Mastercard  and  hopes  to  quell  fears  of  digital  payments’  vulnerability  to  hacking.  Sweden 
has  strong  access  to  internet  coverage,  even  in  rural  areas,  and  Swedes  have  a  deeper  trust  in 
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institutions  and  new  technology  (Savage,  2019) .  Additionally,  tax  revenue  has  also  increased 
since  payments  made  electronically  leave  a  trail.  
To  add  a  further  futuristic  element,  thousands  of  Swedes  have  injected  tiny  microchips 
the  size  of  a  grain  of  rice  into  their  hands,  just  above  the  thumb,  as  a  way  to  pay  for  purchases, 
unlock  doors,  store  travel  tickets  on  Swedish  railways,  share  social  media  files,  and  store 
emergency  contact  details  with  little  more  than  a  flick  of  the  wrist.  At  a  cost  of  about  $180  and 
with  minimal  pain,  proponents  espouse  the  fact  that  the  chips  are  protected  from  hacking,  though 
there  are  concerns  over  what  data  is  stored  on  the  devices  regarding  health.  One  company  which 
produces,  markets,  and  installs  the  chips  is  called  Biohax,  started  by  Jowan  Osterlund.  Osterlund 
credits  a  culture  which  nurtures  and  values  technology  with  the  lack  of  apprehensiveness  towards 
the  chips.  Additionally,  his  statements  echo  those  in  this  paper:  that  Swedes  may  be  less  worried 
about  privacy  due  to  a  high  level  or  trust  in  companies,  the  government,  banks,  and  government 
institutions  (Savage,  2018) .  While  still  not  commonplace,  the  ability  to  implant  payment 
technology  directly  into  the  body  speaks  volumes  about  how  different  India  and  Sweden  are 
when  it  comes  to  acceptance  of  digital  payments  and  radical  technological  advances.  
The  shift  to  near  cashlessness  has  not  been  completely  positive,  however.  In  2014,  the 
Swedish  Ministry  of  Justice  registered  140,000  electronic  fraud  cases.  Those  who  lobby  for 
security  firms  for  cash  transfers  accuse  the  banks  and  credit  card  companies  of  trying  to 
manipulate  the  market  in  favor  of  cards  and  digital  payments,  which  generate  fee  income  unlike 
cash.  Others  are  worried  about  government  monitoring  and  the  fact  that  their  payments, 
including  the  price  and  where  it  was  paid,  can  so  easily  be  tracked  (Alderman,  2015) .  
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A  group  called  the  Kontantupproret,  or  Cash  Rebellion,  claims  there  is  a  conspiracy 
between  Sweden’s  banks  to  eliminate  cash  and  links  demonetization  in  this  manner  to  loss  of 
privacy  and  individual  freedoms.  Many  groups  may  also  be  affected  by  a  transition  to  a  cashless 
system:  the  less  tech-savvy  elderly,  the  disabled,  and  migrants  who  are  used  to  using  cash  in  their 
home  countries.  Migrants  may  have  a  distrust  in  institutions  stemming  from  experiences  in  their 
home  lands  and  are  often  the  last  to  commit  to  cashlessness.  Regardless  of  the  shift  to  digital 
payments,  the  Civil  Contingencies  Agency,  responsible  for  preparing  Sweden  for  a  variety  of 
crises,  still  advises  that  cash  be  kept  in  small  amounts  at  home  in  the  event  that  payment  systems 
collapse  (Orange,  2019) .  A  shift  to  total  cashlessness  would  pose  an  existential  crisis  to  the 
central  bank.  Additionally,  individuals  would  be  left  to  rely  solely  on  the  private  sector  to  gain 
access  to  money  and  digital  payment  methods  (Skingsley,  2018) .  In  a  society  which  has  great 
trust  in  the  government  and  banking  systems,  this  could  change  Sweden  in  radical  ways.  
There  has  been  pushback  to  cashlessness  recently,  reflected  by  the  fact  that  in  2018  the 
amount  of  physical  cash  in  circulation  increased  for  the  first  time  in  more  than  10  years.  This  can 
be  largely  attributed  to  representation  by  seniors  groups  and  those  which  represent  the  more 
vulnerable  in  Swedish  society.  Many  have  complained  that  they  are  not  opposed  to  cashlessness 
itself,  but  just  the  rapid  speed  with  which  it  was  adopted  by  Swedish  banks,  the  government,  and 
merchants  (Detrixhe,  2019) .  To  add  another  layer  of  confusion  to  those  already  weary  of 
adopting  digital  payment  methods,  the  Riksbank  overhauled  its  currency  just  as  digital  payment 
apps  were  gaining  popularity.  
In  2008,  the  Riksbank,  following  a  survey  given  to  residents  in  Sweden,  decided  to 
reexamine  and  revamp  its  banknotes  and  coins  with  the  goal  of  creating  new,  more  secure 
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designs  that  were  more  environmentally  friendly  (Riksbank,  2018,  p.  6) .  The  goal  was  to  finish 
this  project  in  2017.  Several  coins  were  withdrawn  from  circulation  and  replaced  with  newly 
designed  coins  that  were  smaller,  weighed  less,  and  did  not  contain  nickel,  a  chemical  harmful  to 
the  environment  and  to  those  allergic  to  it.  Banknotes  were  withdrawn,  made  more  secure, 
formatted  to  be  smaller,  and  newly  designed.  After  June  30th,  2017,  all  banknotes  and  coins  were 
rendered  invalid,  though  the  Riksbank  had  launched  comprehensive  campaigns  previously  to 
ensure  that  the  populace  was  well  informed.  Given  that  the  initiative  had  started  9  years  prior, 
there  were  no  serious  issues.  By  December  31st,  2017,  92%  of  the  old  banknotes  and  52%  of  the 
old  coins  had  been  returned  (Riksbank,  2018,  pg.  7).  Subsequent  surveys  showed  a  drop  in  the 
use  of  physical  cash  in  general.  Given  that  Swedes  do  not  consistently  use  large  quantities  of 
money  on  a  regular  basis,  the  initiative  to  overhaul  the  currency  for  security  and  environmental 
purposes  went  off  without  a  hitch.  This  was  due  to  the  long  time  in  which  the  changeover  took 
place,  nearly  10  years,  the  simple  fact  that  people  do  not  use  cash  often,  the  inclusion  of  the 
Swedish  people’s  perspectives  in  surveys  pre  and  post-overhaul,  and  the  substantial  information 
campaigns  waged  by  the  Swedish  government. 
Sweden’s  shift  to  near  cashlessness  seems  almost  natural.  It  was  a  response  to  increased 
tech,  a  trust  in  the  system,  and  a  desire  to  prevent  theft.  While  the  Swedish  banks  did  eventually 
respond  with  regulations  that  furthered  the  cashless  agenda,  the  cashless  movement  seems  to  be 
embraced  by  the  majority  of  Swedes  and  there  is  no  sign  of  going  back  to  using  cash  any  time 
soon.  
Unlike  India,  demonetization  in  Sweden  was  a  decision  adopted  by  the  market  and 
supported  by  the  government.  India’s  demonetization  was  forced  from  the  top.  Besides  the  fact 
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that  both  countries  transitioned  to  a  more  digital  payment  system,  using  credit  and  debit  cards 
and  payment  apps  in  place  of  bills  and  coins,  the  similarities  end  there.  Therefore,  the  following 
questions  are  presented:  Why  were  the  results  of  demonetization  vastly  different  in  India  and 
Sweden?  What  are  the  factors  in  both  countries  which,  in  Sweden’s  case,  facilitated 
demonetization  and  in  India’s  case  caused  damage  in  nearly  all  sectors  of  public  and  private  life?  
IV.  Discussion 
The  factors  that  differentiate  and  explain  demonetization  in  India  and  Sweden  can  be 
divided  into  Two  groups:  cultural  and  economic.  Cultural  factors  include  uncertainty  avoidance, 
jugaad,  preference  for  cash,  and  political  culture.  Economic  factors  include  the  origin  of  change 
and  income  inequality. 
1. Cultural  Factors  
Demonetization  is  an  economic  event,  but  only  superficially.  The  reasons  for 
demonetization  as  well  as  the  responses  to  it  and  its  results  are  rooted  in  cultural  factors.  Without 
considering  how  cultural  factors  contribute  to  the  differences  between  India  and  Sweden  and 
their  demonetization  events,  only  half  of  the  story  is  told.  Uncertainty  avoidance,  jugaad, 
preference  for  cash,  and  political  culture  must  be  taken  into  account  when  considering  the 
differences  between  these  two  countries’  demonetization  efforts.  
A. Uncertainty  Avoidance 
Following  India's  demonetization,  mobile  payments  were  adopted  at  higher  rates  over 
traditional  credit  and  debit  cards  due  to  the  introduction  of  low-cost  internet  and  an  increased 
risk  perception  that  payment  cards  could  be  stolen.  Post-demonetization  Indians  rushed  to  digital 
transactions  to  fill  the  void  left  behind  by  cash,  resulting  in  a  300%  rise  of  digital  transactions 
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and  a  435%  increase  in  traffic  to  one  payment  app  in  particular,  Paytm  (Pal  &  Herath,  2018,  p. 
3) .  Several  factors  contributed  to  the  rise:  many  existing  mobile  payment  apps  offered  discount 
codes  or  cashback,  there  was  a  drop  in  internet  access  prices,  and  unlike  credit  and  debit  cards, 
mobile  payment  apps  have  yet  to  suffer  wide  scale  security  violations.  The  perceived  low  risk 
that  payment  apps  have  may  be  due  to  their  novelty  and  a  lack  of  media  reporting  on  hacking  of 
payment  app  services,  but  it  is  certainly  linked  to  the  concept  of  uncertainty  avoidance.  
Uncertainty  avoidance  (hereafter  referred  to  as  UA)  is  a  measurement  between  0  and  100 
regarding  the  extent  to  which  people  become  nervous  or  threatened  by  uncertain  situations.  This 
means  that  countries  whose  scores  are  lower  are  more  likely  to  accept  and  use  new  technology 
faster  (Pal  &  Herath,  2018).  It  can  help  us  understand  how  a  society,  or  in  this  case,  country, 
tackles  an  unknown  future:  do  they  deal  with  ambiguity  by  responding  with  nervousness  and 
avoidance  or  do  they  attack  it  head  on? 
India  scores  40,  suggesting  a  medium  low  score.  This  means  that  tolerance  for  the 
unexpected  is  high  and  imperfection  is  accepted.  According  to  Hofstede  Insights,  the 
organization  which  conducts  research  regarding  UA,  a  low  UA  score  may  manifest  itself  in  an 
acceptance  of  routine  without  question,  but  also  an  ability  to  skirt  around  rules.  Indians  may  be 
less  worried  about  new  technology  and  more  likely  to  adopt  it,  as  they  were  post-demonetization. 
Circumventing  official  rules  occurred  as  in  the  practice  of  using  money  mules  in  order  to  avoid 
waiting  in  long  lines  or  converting  cash  to  gold.  Not  many  in  power  really  questioned  Modi’s 
decree;  they  may  have  complained,  but  demonetization  continued  without  much  backlash  from 
government  officials.  
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Interestingly,  Sweden  scores  just  11  points  below  India  with  a  UA  score  of  29.  Lower  UA 
countries  are  said  to  have  a  more  relaxed  attitude  and  may  deviate  from  the  norm.  Here,  rules  are 
kept  in  place  only  if  necessary  and  functional  and  innovation  is  accepted  (“Country 
Comparison,”  n.d.) .  Sweden’s  reputation  as  a  technological  innovator  reflects  this,  as  does  its 
willingness  to  cut  out  cash  as  a  result  of  higher  robberies  and  lack  of  use.  
While  UA  is  not  the  only  predictor  of  why  both  countries  eventually  went  through 
demonetization  and  their  response,  it  does  give  insight  into  how  Sweden  and  India  responded  to 
their  unique  events.  A  component  that  is  essential  to  any  country  attempting  demonetization  is 
technology  already  in  place,  and  UA  is  connected  to  acceptance  of  technology,  according  to  a 
study  (Straub,  Keil,  &  Brenner,  1997,  p.  1) .  Straub  et  al.  1997  studied  how  people  from  different 
cultures  with  different  UA  scores  use  communicative  technology  at  work:  via  traditional  media 
or  computer-based  media.  Their  results  indicated  that  cultures  in  which  UA  is  high  “are  expected 
to  use  electronic  media  less  often”  (Straub  et  al.,  1997,  p.  4)  because  of  a  perception  that 
face-to-face  communication  reduces  uncertainty.  The  conclusion  is  that  workers  from  high  UA 
cultures  may  perceive  computer-based  media  as  less  useful  or  harder  to  use  (Straub  et  al.,  1997, 
p.  11) .  While  at  the  time  the  media  being  studied  was  likely  email  or  instant  messages,  the  results 
reflect  current  times  and  the  latest  technologies. 
With  Sweden  being  an  early  innovator  with  various  technologies  and  apps,  their  low  UA 
designation  is  far  from  surprising.  Sweden’s  high  rate  of  use  of  technology  and  acceptance  of 
cashlessness  is  due,  in  part,  to  their  low  UA  score  and  perceptions  of  change.  India  is  a  bit 
trickier  to  figure  out.  India  had  a  difficult  time  adjusting  to  a  world  post-demonetization,  but 
eventually  caught  on  to  payment  apps  and  adjusted  accordingly,  though  the  return  to  cash  shows 
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that  a  strong  preference  for  cash  is  hard  to  shake  off.  Their  medium  low  UA  score  indicates  that 
while  Indians  may  find  it  easier  to  adjust  to  uncertainty  in  their  lives,  they  may  also  have  slight 
issues  accepting  new  technology  such  as  payment  apps.  In  addition,  their  medium-low  score 
indicates  that  Indians  may  attempt  to  twist  and  bend  the  rules,  which  was  clear  in  the 
announcement  of  demonetization  and  near-daily  rule  changes  and  a  mindset  that  the  rules  can  be 
navigated  around.  
Both  countries  adjusted  to  demonetization  by  accepting  new  technology,  though 
Sweden’s  transition  has  been  met  with  less  resistance  and  was  an  effort  initiated  mostly  by  the 
people.  India’s  adjustment  period  was  rough  due  to  the  added  dimension  of  converting  old  notes 
to  new  notes  at  banks  and  as  an  effort  sprung  upon  them  literally  overnight.  Sweden’s  lower  UA 
score  suggests  a  country  more  likely  to  transition  with  greater  ease  to  digital  payments  and  an 
enthusiasm  for  compliance  with  rules  that  they  deem  just.  India’s  medium  low  score  has  allowed 
them  to  transition  due  to  a  cultural  attitude  that  emphasizes  being  open  to  adjustment,  but  it  has 
also  hindered  the  acceptance  of  demonetization  due  to  cultural  norms  that  allow  for  rules  to  be 
skirted.  Thus,  in  concurrence  with  its  very  low  UA  score,  Sweden’s  demonetization  effort  was 
widely  accepted  in  the  beginning  and  followed  through  with  few  issues,  in  contrast  to  India.  
Uncertainty  avoidance  absolutely  contributed  to  how  India  and  Sweden  responded 
differently  to  demonetization.  UA  alludes  to  another  cultural  factor,  but  this  one  is  uniquely 
Indian:  jugaad.  UA  and  jugaad  are  both  associated  with  adaptation  to  situations  based  on  what 
one  has  and  thus  they  complement  each  other  in  the  context  of  demonetization.  
B. Jugaad  (“Making  Do”) 
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Jugaad  is  a  form  of  innovation  that  maximizes  the  use  of  everyday  objects  to  transform 
them  into  much-needed  objects,  such  as  transportation,  support  systems,  etc.  Everyday  objects 
are  used  to  solve  problems  when  resources  are  limited.  It  can  even  be  a  euphemism  for 
corruption,  implying  the  use  of  social  networks  to  gain  connections  (Jauregui,  2014,  p.  76) .  The 
key  to  understanding  jugaad  is  that,  when  given  limited  financial,  physical,  or  relational 
resources,  one  improvises  with  whatever  they  have  been  given  to  advance  their  goal,  be  it 
creating  a  vehicle  from  scrap  metal  or  bribing  someone  in  power  to  obtain  a  promotion.  It  is 
associated  with  being  resourceful.  The  way  one  uses  jugaad  is  very  much  dependent  on  the 
position  they  occupy  in  the  world.  Jauregui  references  Molekhiet’s  writing  in  describing  jugaad: 
“one  is  for  the  privileged  city-slicker  who  uses  it  to  bend  laws  or  work  around  his  problems;  and 
the  other,  more  importantly,  for  the  less  privileged  where  Jugaad  is  the  means  to  their  survival” 
(Jauregui,  2014,  p.  77) .  There  are  at  least  two  types  of  jugaad:  one  which  is  required  when  faced 
with  adversity  and  making  do  with  what  one  has,  and  another  which  is  a  form  of  corruption  used 
by  the  privileged  to  secure  power.  
In  an  article  about  her  experiences  post-demonetization,  Ranjona  Banerji  writes  about 
how  jugaad  comes  into  effect  in  times  like  these:  “A  local  trader,  meanwhile,  is  offering  an 
exchange  scheme  –  Rs100  off  every  Rs500  or  Rs1000  note.  The  great  Indian  jugaad  (making  do) 
always  comes  majestically  to  the  fore  at  times  like  this”  (Banerji,  2017) .  Other  accounts  show 
how  creative  Indian  jugaad  was  used  to  bypass  government  rules  and  to  make  life  a  bit  easier  in 
trying  times.  Instead  of  waiting  in  long  lines,  bank  customers  wanting  to  exchange  notes  took  off 
their  footwear  and  placed  it  in  line,  freeing  them  to  sit  nearby,  play  games,  or  enjoy  a  cup  of  chai 
while  waiting  for  their  spot  in  line  to  be  serviced.  Other  customers  placed  the  necessary 
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documents  on  the  ground,  held  in  place  by  a  brick  or  rock,  marking  their  place  in  line 
(“Demonetisation  effect,”  2016) .  Those  who  could  not  afford  to  wait  in  line  but  could  afford  a 
surrogate  to  stand  in  their  place  at  the  bank  used  apps  to  find  day  laborers  willing  to  wait  in  line 
for  between  Rs40  and  Rs150  per  hour  as  a  proxy  (“Demonetisation  ‘jugaad,’”  2016) .  A  loan  and 
banking  app  called  Money  View  quickly  identified  a  much  needed  service:  an  app  that  could 
help  users  locate  ATMs  that  still  had  cash.  This  component  of  their  app  was  built  quickly  to 
address  their  customers’  needs.  User-driven,  the  app  allows  for  immediate  updates  of  ATM 
locations  which  have  yet  to  run  out  of  cash  and  also  provides  estimates  of  the  length  of  lines 
(Shah,  2016) .  These  examples  show  innovation  used  to  ease  stress  and  maximize  time  when 
given  circumstances  that  are  out  of  one’s  control.  However,  greater  examples  of  the  more  corrupt 
version  of  Indian  jugaad   arose  when  avoiding  demonetization  and  attempting  to  skirt  around  the 
law  whenever  possible.  
Examples  of  avoiding  depositing  money  and  thus  avoiding  suspicion  of  being  associated 
with  black  money  are  rife.  A  real  estate  developer  in  Vadodara  paid  his  employees  six  months  of 
salary  in  advance,  an  ingenious  way  to  get  rid  of  Rs500  and  Rs1000  notes  to  unsuspecting  day 
laborers.  Others  who  have  hoarded  large  notes  hired  middlemen  who  charge  commissions  to 
exchange  notes  but  avoid  government  suspicion.  Some  ran  to  the  jewellers  to  purchase  large 
amounts  of  gold,  investing  their  potentially  black  money  into  physical  goods  that  could  be  sold 
for  legitimate  notes  once  the  hype  of  demonetization  wore  off.  More  malicious  were  those  who 
ran  off  to  religious  institutions,  exchanging  Rs500  and  Rs1000  notes  with  smaller  notes  as 
donations  (Dave,  2016) .  Others  purchased  train  and  flight  tickets  only  to  cancel  them  and  seek 
refunds  in  new  notes  (Shekhar,  2016) .  These  are  just  a  few  examples  of  the  more  malevolent, 
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corrupt  version  of  jugaad,  though  still  uniquely  Indian  solutions  to  the  problems  faced  by  many 
following  the  demonetization  announcement.  
Demonetization  had  at  least  one  clear  goal  when  it  was  put  forth  by  Modi:  address  tax 
evasion  and  increase  tax  revenues  by  increasing  the  tax  base.  Whatever  might  transpire  would  be 
either  collateral  damage  or  benefits  to  the  policy,  but  tax  revenue  was  the  primary  driver  of 
demonetization.  Talukdar  brings  up  an  interesting  point:  that  the  government  had  a  skewed 
version  of  reality.  He  writes  that  the  government  “underestimated  the  innate  Indian  talent  for 
jugaad”  and  that  “meta-corruption  seems  to  be  at  work”  (Talukdar,  2016) .  Subsequent 
addendums  and  revisions  to  the  original  demonetization  rules  were  common;  more  than  ten  rules 
were  changed  or  put  in  place  just  one  week  after  demonetization  was  announced  (Shekhar, 
2016) .  These  revisions  were  made  to  address  the  jugaad  people  were  employing  to  bypass  rules 
and  regulations,  creative  solutions  that  the  government  did  not  anticipate.  
To  address  the  problems  that  arose  and  to  attempt  to  close  the  loopholes  innovative 
jugaad  users  had  been  abusing,  the  Modi  government  instituted  ten  changes.  Exchange  limits 
were  restricted  from  Rs4,000  to  Rs2,000  per  card  per  day,  then  back  to  Rs4,000.  Withdrawal 
limits  in  banks  and  ATMs  were  increased.  Exemption  dates  in  which  old  notes  must  have  been 
exchanged  for  new  notes  were  pushed  back  from  November  14th  to  November  24th,  and  made 
even  longer  for  those  receiving  pensions.  Exemptions  were  made  for  many  industries  that  were 
allowed  to  continue  collecting  old  notes  until  November  14th.  Upon  reports  of  long,  deadly  lines, 
the  government  requested  that  banks  set  up  separate  lines  for  the  elderly  and  differently-abled. 
Indelible  ink,  the  ink  typically  applied  to  voters’  fingernails  after  casting  their  vote,  was  used 
now  for  those  who  had  deposited  their  limit  of  notes.  Jan  Dhan  accounts,  part  of  an  initiative  to 
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give  the  poor  bank  accounts,  were  now  being  used  only  to  deposit  unusable  notes  and  thus  were 
given  deposit  limits.  Lastly,  but  certainly  not  the  only  later  change  made  by  Modi,  surveillance 
footage  of  jewelry  shops  was  demanded  to  target  those  who  attempted  to  creatively  get  around 
the  law  by  turning  their  black  money  assets  into  gold  (Shekhar,  2016) .  These  are  some,  but  not 
all  of  the  changes  made  in  response  to  jugaad  post-demonetization. 
Corruption,  demonetization,  and  jugaad  are  softly  linked.  Demonetization,  according  to 
some,  was  an  effort  made  by  Modi  and  the  BJP  to  root  out  black  money  from  his  opponents, 
making  it  easier  for  his  party  to  campaign  and  win  elections.  Demonetization  was,  in  its  own 
way,  a  form  of  jugaad  by  the  Modi  administration  to  win  elections  using  their  connections  to 
create  an  ideal  reality.  Jugaad  in  this  case  involved  using  one’s  connections  and  power  to  achieve 
a  goal,  which  in  this  case  was  winning  elections.  
Culturally,  jugaad  may  have  roots  in  Indian  philosophy  and  even  connections  to  the 
aforementioned  uncertainty  avoidance.  Comparing  Abrahamic  and  Indian  Dharmic  systems  of 
thought,  R.  Jagannathan,  an  Indian  journalist,  wrote  
In  the  Abrahamic  system,  it  is  criminal  to  evade  tax.  Thus,  you  are  a  good  guy  if 
you  pay  tax,  and  a  bad  guy  if  you  don’t.  The  outcome  is  binary.  In  the  Dharmic 
mindset  that  most  Indians  operate  in,  we  both  pay  taxes  and  attempt  to  evade 
them,  depending  on  what  we  think  is  just  and  acceptable.  Tax  is  a  matter  of 
individual  judgment  and  negotiation.  Punishment  for  not  paying  tax  is  karmic  – 
outside  the  ambit  of  the  state  (Talukdar,  2016) . 
 
Jugaad  in  its  more  concrete  manifestation,  as  in  creatively  finding  ways  to  go  around  laws, 
obtain  jobs  or  power,  or  otherwise  get  what  one  wants,  has  deep  roots  in  subconscious  thought. 
We  can  examine  Jaganathan’s  quote  through  the  lens  of  what  happened  after  demonetization: 
laypeople,  faced  with  a  chaotic,  disjointed  policy  pushed  on  them  from  those  at  the  very  top, 
perhaps  thinking  that  it  was  unjust  and  unacceptable,  did  what  they  could  to  individually  judge 
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and  negotiate  what  they  perceived  as  fair.  According  to  them,  in  the  end,  the  state  does  not 
necessarily  judge  those  who  avoid  paying  tax  or  otherwise  going  through  the  trials  of  exchanging 
unusable  notes  for  usable  ones;  it  is  the  universe  via  karma  that  will  take  care  of  any  committed 
wrongdoing.  This  is  specific  to  India  and  helps  us  understand  why  demonetization  was  met  with 
such  difficulty  there:  innovating  against  the  system  was  par  for  the  course,  and  those  with  power 
were  shocked  to  suddenly,  potentially,  be  held  accountable  for  their  actions  and  made  to  pay 
taxes.  
By  using  one’s  social  connections  or  creative  innovations,  rules  and  regulations  are 
bypassed  and  creative  ways  of  achieving  goals  are  achieved.  Demonetization  was  itself  a  form  of 
jugaad  to  fight  campaign  corruption  on  “the  other  side”,  or  against  political  parties  that  work 
with  black  money  to  gain  votes  in  elections  against  the  Modi  administration  and  the  BJP. 
Post-demonetization  was  a  perfect  example  of  the  ingenuity  of  the  Indian  people  dealing  with 
crises  unexpected  by  the  government.  Jugaad  was  shoes  in  place  of  bodies  in  line,  app 
developers  working  around  the  clock  to  provide  services  that  found  unique  answers  to  everyday 
people’s  problems,  and  even  the  unlawful  behavior  of   black  money  holders  who  attempted  to 
bypass  demonetization  legislation.  
Jugaad  explains  why  India  was  so  hard-hit  by  demonetization  in  the  first  place.  The 
attitude  of  “it  will  all  work  out”  or  “it  may  sting  now,  but  it  is  for  the  greater  good”  is  often  used 
regarding  demonetization  in  India.  This  was  evidenced  when  Deepak  Parekh,  chairman  of  a  large 
mortgage  lender  called  the  Housing  Development  Finance  Corporation,  said  that  “it  will  be 
disruptive,  it  will  be  inconvenient,  but  in  the  medium  term,  it  will  be  very  good”  (Anand  & 
Kumar,  2016).  However,  data  from  an  online  poll  conducted  by  Huffpost  found  that  the  number 
35 
of  people  who  said  that  the  “pain  of  demonetisation  was  worth  the  state  aim”  was  falling  quickly 
among  the  poor  and  middle  class,  and  slowly  among  the  rich  (Talukdar,  2016). 
Jugaad  is  so  prevalent  that  it  is  expected  for  average  Indians  to  make  it  work  despite  their 
circumstances,  just  as  they  have  in  all  aspects  of  their  lives,  social  and  professional.  The  attitude 
that  everything  would  be  fine  led  to  a  hastily  made  decision  backed  up  by  the  expectation  of 
jugaad-  that  India  would  find  its  way.  The  short-term  repercussions  for  many  Indians  were 
unacceptable,  and  surely  the  idea  of  the  greater  good  hurt  those  Indians  who  lost  family  members 
in  long  bank  lines,  those  whose  farm  crops  failed  to  sell,  or  those  who  failed  to  get  their  salaries.  
The  website  Hofstede  Insights  writes  this  about  India: 
a  word  used  often  is  “adjust”  and  means  a  wide  range  of  things,  from  turning  a 
blind  eye  to  rules  being  flouted  to  finding  a  unique  and  inventive  solution  to  a 
seemingly  insurmountable  problem.  It  is  this  attitude  that  is  both  the  cause  of 
misery  as  well  as  the  most  empowering  aspect  of  the  country.  There  is  a  saying 
that  “nothing  is  impossible”  in  India,  so  long  as  one  knows  how  to  “adjust” 
(“Country  Comparison,”  n.d.)  
 
The  Hindi  word  the  author  implies  is  jugaad,  and  this  quote  clearly  reiterates  that  jugaad  attempts 
to  overcome  huge  problems  by  adjusting;  using  innovation  to  overcome  whatever  difficulty  is 
being  faced.  Indeed,  nothing  is  impossible  in  India,  including  overnight  demonetization  of  over 
one  billion  people,  many  of  whom  exclusively  use  cash  and  lack  true  access  to  formal  banking 
systems.  For  these  people,  adjustment  on  a  grand  scale  is  needed,  which  is  where  the  widespread 
cultural  idea  of  jugaad  comes  into  play.  
Sweden  does  not  have  an  analog  for  jugaad.  As  mentioned  previously,  its  very  low  UA 
score  indicates  that  laws  which  do  not  work  for  all  will  simply  be  eliminated  or  changed.  Sweden 
has  the  infrastructure  and  social  welfare  system  to  ensure  that  a  safety  net  such  as  jugaad  is  not 
needed.  Thus,  their  transition  to  a  more  cashless  economy  was  smoother  and  less  fraught  with 
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cases  of  individuals  attempting  to  work  around  the  law.  It  was  accepted  as  a  fact  of  modern  life 
and  adopted  by  most.  Jugaad  is  a  powerful  tool  that  can  be  used  for  good  or  bad.  It  is  certainly 
something  that  Sweden  and  India  do  not  have  in  common  and  thus  differentiates  India  and 
Sweden  ‘s  experiences  with  demonetization.  
C. Preference  for  Cash 
Different  societies  have  different  attitudes  towards  cash  which  may  make  it  easier  or 
more  difficult  to  implement  digital  payment  methods.  While  cash  may  be  a  burden  to  a  nation’s 
economy,  it  still  reigns  supreme  globally,  accounting  for  about  75%  of  daily  transactions 
(Henley,  2016) .  Proponents  of  cashless  systems  argue  for  the  security,  efficiency,  boost  to 
economic  growth  and  inclusivity  of  digital  payment  methods,  but  some  countries  still  lag  behind 
in  their  adoption  of  cashless  systems.  In  a  technologically  modern  country  such  as  Japan,  which 
has  the  infrastructure  to  mobilize  a  cashless  society,  cash  is  still  supreme.  This  is  due  to  a  cultural 
preference  for  cash  (Thomas,  2014) .  
MasterCard,  associated  with  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance,  is  obviously  a  proponent  of 
cashless  payment  systems.  Their  study,  “Measuring  Progress  towards  a  Cashless  Society”,  splits 
33  nations  into  4  categories  based  on  their  position  on  the  cashless  timeline:  inception, 
transitioning,  tipping  point,  and  advanced.  Inception  countries  are  so-called  developing  nations 
in  which  90%  or  more  of  all  transactions  are  made  in  cash.  Inception  countries  are  said  by 
Mastercard  to  use  cash  due  to  cultural  preferences,  low  financial  inclusion  rates,  or  low  cashless 
infrastructure.  As  discussed  earlier,  India  pre-demonetization  had  cash  transaction  rates  in  the 
upper  90th  percentile,  making  it  a  part  of  this  inception  group.  The  report  by  Mastercard  says  this 
about  inception  countries  transitioning  to  digital  payment  methods:  “With  their  strong  scores  for 
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trajectory  and  readiness,  our  findings  suggest  that  inception  countries...will  continue  to  shift 
share  at  a  rapid  pace.  This  will  be  driven  largely  by  government  mandates  to  move  benefits 
payments  and  worker  salaries  to  cashless  solutions”  (Thomas,  2014,  p.  4) .  This  statement 
accurately  captures  India’s  demonetization  progress.  
Transitioning  countries  are  those  in  which  cash  transactions  make  up  80-90%  of  all 
transactions.  Mastercard  cites  Japan  as  a  country  which  uses  cash  due  to  cultural  preferences  and 
a  high  volume  of  ATMs.  Brazil  and  China  are  cited  as  countries  formerly  in  the  inception 
category  which  now,  due  to  the  rise  of  the  middle  class,  have  stimulated  the  growth  of  banking 
and  payment  services.  Spain’s  high  cash  usage  is  due  to  a  slow  economy  (Thomas,  2014,  p.  2) .  
Next  are  the  tipping  point  countries.  These  are  countries  where  a  shift  to  cashlessness 
may  be  in  the  near  future,  but  the  “people  must  make  the  choice  to  change.”  Again,  cash  in  these 
situations  is  preferred  because  of  a  lack  of  cashless  solutions,  cultural  factors,  and  local 
economics  “conspiring  to  keep  cash  in  the  lead”  (Thomas,  2014,  p.  3) .  Finally,  advanced 
countries  are  those  in  which  digital  payments  are  available  and  most  people  have  debit  cards 
which  are  accepted  almost  universally.  Here,  the  benefits  of  paying  with  digital  methods  are 
understood  and  cashlessness  is  growing.  
To  solve  the  problem  of  cash-intensive  national  economies  which  prefer  cash  for  cultural 
reasons,  Mastercard  offers  the  suggestion  of  “  educating  consumers  on  the  benefits  of  going 
cashless”  (Thomas,  2014,  p.  5) .   However,  even  in  countries  such  as  Japan,  which  have  the 
digital  infrastructure  and  banking  systems  to  be  cashless,  cash  reigns  supreme  due  to  cultural 
factors.  Japan  is  an  example  of  how  cultural  factors  can  impact  a  nation’s  economy.  The  Prime 
Minister  of  Japan,  Shinzo  Abe,  wants  to  increase  smartphone-based  payments  in  Japan,  but  he 
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has  been  met  with  a  significant  amount  of  criticism.  ATMs  are  efficient  and  prevalent  on 
Japanese  streets,  which  makes  cash  a  daily  convenience.  Cash  usage  in  Japan  has  doubled 
recently,  partly  due  to  a  new  policy,  which  created  negative  interest  rates  on  deposits.  Japanese 
banker  Daisuke  Yamada  at  Mizuho  Bank  has  compared  the  introduction  of  cashlessness  to  the 
US  warships  that  forced  Japan  to  participate  in  international  trade  in  1853,  a  clear  comparison  to 
the  aversion  of  outside  influence  on  Japan.  To  stretch  this  theory  globally,  cashlessness  could  be 
interpreted  by  other  countries  as  an  outside,  colonial  concept  forced  upon  them.  
Culturally,  cash  is  perceived  as  the  perfect  way  to  stay  within  a  budget  since  digital 
payments  may  allow  consumers  to  overspend.  In  addition,  there  are  worries  across  cultures  of 
consumers’  financial  data  and  information  about  their  spending  being  sold  for  marketing 
purposes.  A  cultural  aversion  to  online  scams  creates  wariness  about  being  tracked  by  companies 
as  well  as  having  private  information  stolen.  Lastly,  cash  is  the  “back-up  plan  when  electronic 
systems  go  down”.  The  ATM  Industry  Association  is  quoted  as  saying  that  they  support  “the 
peaceful  co-existence  of  cash  and  cashlessness  so  there  is  maximum  choice  and  convenience  for 
all  citizens”  (Obe,  2017) .  
While  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance  group  advocates  for  the  proliferation  and  inclusivity 
of  digital  payment  methods,  conversely,  the  Cash  Matters  group  advocates  for  the  coexistence  of 
cash  and  digital  payments  based  on  consumer  convenience.  Cash  Matters  is  an  alliance  of  the 
ATM  Industry  Association,  the  European  Security  Transport  Association  (ESTA),  the  European 
Intelligent  Cash  Protection  Association  (EURICPA),  Intergraf,  an  organization  which  represents 
European  printing  and  security  printing  industries,  and  Ja  Til  Kontanter,  a  pro-cash  Norwegian 
interest  group.  
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Cash  Matters,  unlike  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance,  works  to  promote  the  use  of  cash 
through  statistics.  They  state  that  cash  is  more  inclusive  and  believe  in  an  economy  in  which 
cash  and  digital  payment  methods  can  thrive  simultaneously  depending  on  the  consumer’s 
convenience  (“Cash  Alliance—About  Us  &  Our  Partners,”  n.d.) .  It  is  important  to  note  that  both 
Cash  Matters  and  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance  believe  in  the  same  concept  of  inclusivity  that 
cash  and  digital  payment  systems  bring,  though  Cash  Matters  advocates  for  both  based  on 
consumer  preference.  Interesting,  too,  are  their  different  partners.  The  Cash  Matters  partners  hail 
from  security,  printing,  and  ATM  backgrounds,  while  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance  Partners 
variety  of  partners  come  from  government,  banking,  credit  card,  and  other  sectors.  It  certainly 
seems  the  odds  are  stacked  against  the  proliferation  of  cash  in  today’s  world.  
Yet  in  India,  cash  still  rules  despite  Modi’s  2016  demonetization  efforts.  While  there  was 
a  drop  in  cash  use  post-demonetization,  perhaps  simply  due  to  the  unavailability  of  cash,  cash 
usage  rose  once  ATMs  were  replenished  with  freshly  printed  500  rupee  and  2000  rupee  notes.  By 
May  2018,  the  cash-to-GDP  ratio  had  returned  to  levels  seen  pre-demonetization  (Paliath,  2019) . 
Cash  withdrawal  at  ATMs  grew  from  Rs  1.1  trillion  in  January-March  2016  to  Rs  1.4  trillion  in 
January-March  2018,  a  notable  rise.  Data  suggests  that  cash  demand  rose  because  availability  of 
cash  improved  in  the  months  following  demonetization  (Nayak,  2018) .  Looking  at  total  cash  in 
circulation  further  proves  the  importance  of  cash  in  India:  on  April  6th  2018,  the  total  cash  in 
circulation  was  Rs  18.4  trillion  compared  to  17.98  trillion  a  few  days  before  demonetization. 
This  higher  rate  clearly  shows  that  truly  moving  over  to  digital  payment  methods  was  not  a 
materialized  goal  by  the  RBI  or  the  government.  If  these  trends  continue,  rates  of  cash  in 
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circulation  will  be  even  higher  in  the  coming  years  despite  efforts  to  convert  cash-loving  citizens 
to  cards  and  payment  apps.  
The  Indian  government  was  betting  on  demonetization  to  work  and  for  Indians  to  be  less 
reliant  on  cash.  This  did  not  happen,  as  evidenced  by  high  rates  of  cash  in  circulation,  demand  at 
ATMs,  and  harvest  and  election  seasons  that  are  still  heavily  reliant  on  cash  flow  (Dattagupta, 
2018) .  The  rapid  adoption  of  payment  apps  seemed  to  give  hope  and  credence  to  those  in  support 
of  a  more  cashless  India,  but  the  data  show  otherwise.  Why  has  weaning  Indians  off  cash  been  so 
unsuccessful?  Why  does  India  seem  to  be  so  reliant  on  cash,  despite  efforts  made  to  improve 
access  to  banking  and  digital  infrastructure,  allowing  for  the  widespread  use  of  cards  and  apps? 
First,  vendors  cite  that  there  is  a  lack  of  demand  for  digital  payment  methods,  leading  to  a 
lack  of  point-of-service  machines  and  even  fewer  vendors  who  actually  accept  cards  or  payment 
apps.  In  a  survey  of  over  1,000  merchants  in  Jaipur,  Rajasthan,  the  University  of  California 
found  that  low  use  of  digital  payments  was  not  due  to  a  lack  of  availability,  but  to  low  demand 
because  customers  simply  do  not  want  to  pay  digitally.  Connected  to  this  are  concerns  that 
consumers  may  be  more  liable  to  pay  taxes  if  there  are  records  of  their  payments.  Those  who  did 
adopt  digital  payment  methods  cite  the  fact  that  80%  of  their  transactions  are  still  conducted 
using  cash  (Paliath,  2019) .  
Cash  is,  quite  simply,  more  convenient  and  habitual.  It  is  anonymous  in  a  country  in 
which  citizens  distrust  the  financial  sector.  Cash  can  be  used  anywhere,  whereas  some  digital 
payment  services  are  still  being  adopted  in  certain  areas.  Cash  is  also  accepted  by  everyone,  from 
the  street  vendor  to  the  dudhwala  who  brings  fresh  milk  door-to-door  to  shops  in  the  mall.  Cash 
is  tangible  in  the  way  that  digital  payments  are  not;  when  you  have  it,  it  is  yours.  Salil  Tripathi, 
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in  his  piece  titled  “Collateral  damage  of  demonetisation”,  writes  that  cash  works  even  if  the 
power  is  cut  or  bank  branches  are  closed;  it  does  not  force  reliance  on  being  in  close  proximity  to 
a  bank  branch,  nor  does  it  require  a  user  to  remember  passwords.  Cash  works  when  cellphones 
do  not.  He  says,  “cash  is  the  language  of  transactions,  with  which  you,  and  millions  of  others,  are 
used  to  conducting  business  daily”.  Tripathi  says  that  cash  is  preferred  because  there  are  no 
functional  alternatives,  which  is  apparent  when  considering  rising  ATM  usage  and  more  notes  in 
circulation  now  than  prior  to  demonetization.  Ultimately,  Tripathi  sums  it  up  simply  “cash  is 
universally  trusted  and  understood”  (Tripathi,  2016) . 
Despite  claims  that  there  has  been  an  uneven  growth  of  digital  payment  acceptance,  the 
University  of  California  survey  shows  that,  at  least  in  a  decently  well-connected  city  such  as 
Jaipur,  this  is  not  an  issue.  It  is  surely  an  issue  in  smaller,  more  rural  areas.  In  Jaipur,  however, 
vendors  are  aware  of  digital  payment  methods.  98.6%  of  survey  respondents  had  the  documents 
necessary  for  implementing  digital  payment  methods,  as  well  as  the  digital  literacy  and  income 
required  for  adopting  point-of-service  systems.  Yet,  only  42%  had  actually  adopted  digital 
payments  (Paliath,  2019) .  This  is  simply  because  accepting  digital  payments  is  not  necessary  to 
maintaining  customers  or  good  business  practices;  customers  find  it  easier  and  more  convenient 
to  pay  with  cash.  
In  more  rural  areas,  the  infrastructure  necessary  to  accept  digital  payment  methods  has 
not  kept  up  with  the  infrastructure  already  existing  in  the  cities.  There  simply  are  not  enough 
ATMs  or  point-of-service  systems  in  rural  areas,  and  there  are  also  issues  with  internet 
connectivity  and  spotty  wireless  coverage.  Even  though  India  has  an  estimated  14  million 
vendors,  the  number  of  point-of-service  machines  or  devices  is  only  1.2  million;  as  a  result,  90% 
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of  vendors  have  no  medium  to  collect  digital  payments,  though  this  number  has  likely  grown 
since  demonetization  (Jaleel,  2016) .  Even  as  the  free  digital  platform  Paytm  implements 
tantalizing  incentives  such  as  cash  bank  on  purchases  and  free-credit  card  processing  for  vendors 
(V.  Goel  &  Raj,  2018) ,  the  data  show  that  Indians  continue  to  use  cash  in  droves.  
In  addition  to  a  lack  of  desire  to  use  digital  payment  methods  as  well  as  a  lack  of 
accessibility  in  some  areas  of  India,  many  fear  being  cheated  and  losing  money,  or  have  worries 
about  a  lack  of  security.  Indians,  unlike  other  citizens  of  developing  countries,  are  not  subjected 
to  the  fear  of  carrying  cash  and  having  a  thief  steal  it  (Paliath,  2019) .  Rather,  the  fear  lies  in 
distrust  of  digital  payment  companies.  In  an  article  for  the  New  York  Times ,  Ghani  Khan  stated 
that  Rs3,300  had  been  stolen  from  his  Paytm  account  and  not  returned.  This  event  led  to  a 
distaste  in  and  distrust  of  payment  apps  (V.  Goel  &  Raj,  2018) .  Indian  distrust  extends  to  the 
government,  as  will  be  covered  later,  but  this  has  been  apparent  even  prior  to  demonetization. 
Upon  the  first  announcement  of  demonetization,  people  ran  to  exchange  cash  into  physical  assets 
in  order  to  avoid  government  meddling  in  their  business.  The  Economic  Times  reported  that 
“people  still  have  greater  trust  in  cash  compared  to  digital  transactions”  (Pal  &  Herath,  2018,  p. 
3) .  Even  those  who  have  been  forced  to  transition  to  digital  payment  methods  have  reverted  back 
to  using  cash  now  that  the  cash  crisis  has  finished  (Pal  &  Herath,  2018,  p.  3) .   This  preference  for 
tangible  wealth  is  explained  by  the  author  of  the  University  of  California  study  mentioned  above:  
Bank  accounts  simply  aren't  that  important  to  people  who  prefer  to  use  cash  in 
transactions,  and  who  store  wealth  in  physical  assets  such  as  land,  grain,  or  gold,” 
Ligon  said.  “A  preference  for  cash  and  physical  assets  makes  sense  if  one  doesn't 
trust  the  financial  sector,  or  the  government,  which  plays  such  a  large  role  in 
regulating  it,  as  in  India  (Paliath,  2019) .  
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Lastly,  there  is  a  financial  barrier  to  digital  payment  methods.  The  poor  may  not  have  the 
time  to  take  off  work  to  open  bank  accounts  and  maintain  the  minimum  balance  or  even  the 
documents  required  to  open  an  account  in  the  first  place.  They  may  be  treated  badly  at  branches 
if  their  balance  is  not  up  to  standards,  if  they  can  even  find  a  bank  location  that  is  accessible  to 
them.  Smartphones  are  expensive,  and  digital  payment  apps  require  an  amount  of  literacy-  both 
reading  and  financial-  in  order  to  use  them.  Thus,  cash  is  the  great  equalizer.  
In  sum,  cash  is  accepted  by  more  vendors  and  is  readily  available.  Cash  works  when  cell 
coverage  is  spotty  or  the  power  goes  down,  as  it  often  does  in  many  Indian  locations.  Cash  does 
not  discriminate  based  on  literacy  level  or  social  status.  Everyone  uses  it,  everyone  trusts  it,  and 
it  is  digitally  unhackable.  All  in  all,  Indians  prefer  cash  because  it  is  easier  to  use,  widely 
accepted,  and  trustworthy  when  financial  institutions  and  digital  payments  are  not.  
In  contrast,  Swedes  find  that  cash  makes  its  holders  vulnerable  to  theft.  They  trust  their 
governments,  as  will  be  mentioned  in  the  next  section.  Digital  payments  are  more  widely 
accepted  than  cash,  which  many  in  Sweden  report  rarely  using.  Sweden  has  digital  infrastructure, 
digital  literacy,  and  a  preference  for  digital  payment  methods.  All  of  these  factors  made  the 
transition  to  a  nearly  cashless  society  much  easier  for  Sweden.  
D. Political  Culture 
Government  corruption  is  intertwined  with  Indian  demonetization,  but  a  lack  of 
government  corruption  in  Sweden  explains  why  demonetization  in  both  countries  was  vastly 
different.  This  section  will  compare  perceptions  of  corruption  and  instances  of  bribes  in  each 
country,  and  how  this  aspect  of  political  culture  affected  demonetization.  
44 
According  to  Transparency  International,  a  non-government  agency  devoted  to 
monitoring  global  corruption,  Sweden  ranks  3rd  as  the  least  corrupt  country  in  the  world.  In 
addition  to  rank,  Transparency  International  rates  countries  out  of  100,  with  100  being  “very 
clean”  or  nearly  uncorrupt  and  0  being  highly  corrupt.  Sweden’s  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  in 
2018  was  85,  a  number  which  puts  Sweden  just  behind  Denmark  at  91,  New  Zealand  at  90,  and 
ties  it  with  Finland,  Singapore,  and  Switzerland  (“Transparency  International—Sweden,”  2018) . 
In  a  survey  about  perceptions  of  public  sector  corruption,  only  8%  of  Swedes  believed  their 
public  sector  workers,  such  as  police,  elected  representatives,  government  officials,  to  be  corrupt 
(Pring,  2017,  p.  6)  .  This  is  one  of  the  lowest  rates  in  the  world.  In  terms  of  bribery,  less  than  5% 
of  Swedish  people  paid  a  bribe  when  dealing  with  the  public  sector  in  the  last  month  (Pring, 
2017,  p.  7) .  In  a  quote  for  the  Guardian ,  associate  professor  of  industrial  dynamics  at  Sweden’s 
Royal  Institute  of  Technology,  Niklas  Arvidsson  said,  “people  trust  each  other,  the  government 
and  the  banks  more  in  Sweden,  plus  we  have  very  little  corruption”  (Russell,  2014) .  The  data 
backs  up  the  sentiment  of  many  Swedish  people.  
Bribery  and  government  corruption  are  not  problems  in  Sweden.  Distrust  of  the 
government  may  come  from  immigrant  populations,  but  the  majority  are  not  worried.  The 
government  is  very  integrated  into  cashlessness:  several  banks  in  Sweden  no  longer  keep 
physical  cash  on  hand,  and  they  charge  quite  a  bit  to  cash  checks.  This  has  not  been  met  with  ire 
in  Sweden,  but  rather  adaptation.  A  greater  trust  in  the  government  implies  that,  had  the  Swedish 
shift  to  cashlessness  occurred  as  a  government  initiative,  all  might  have  gone  well.  As  it  was, 
government  responses  to  cashlessness  in  the  private  sector,  such  as  charging  higher  rates  to 
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deposit  checks  or  making  public  transit  fare  entirely  digital,  were  accepted  by  the  public  with 
little  backlash.  
In  stark  contrast  are  India’s  rates  of  corruption  and  bribery.  As  of  2018,  India  ranks  78th 
out  of  180  countries  with  a  score  of  41  out  of  100  (“Transparency  International—India,”  2018) . 
This  number  has  risen,  implying  less  corruption  as  time  moves  on.  In  terms  of  bribery,  between 
50-75%  of  Indians  reported  paying  a  bribe  to  a  public  official  within  the  last  month,  a  number 
that  dwarfs  Sweden’s  rates  (Pring,  2017,  p.  7) .  Corruption  in  India  is  endemic;  it  is  something 
that  has  become  a  part  of  the  everyday  routine  for  most  people.  As  Jauregui  notes,  corruption 
“reflect(s)  a  cultural  order  in  which  activities  that  many  would  readily  categorize  as  corruption 
are  collectively  legitimated  in  everyday  practice”  (2014,  p.  80) .  
Ironically,  one  of  the  goals  of  2016’s  demonetization  was  to  fight  corruption  by  opposing 
political  parties;  Narendra  Modi’s  plan  to  demonetize  would  hurt  his  own  party  in  terms  of  the 
cash  kept  on  hand  for  bribes  or  illegal  money  exchange,  but  damage  his  opponents’  parties  much 
more.  Modi  stated  that  the  initiative  was  needed  to  root  out  terrorism  and  corruption  by  removing 
black  money  when  he  said  “cash  in  circulation  is  directly  linked  to  the  level  of  corruption” 
(Padmanabhan,  2019) .   If  his  own  words  are  to  be  heeded,  then  the  higher  amounts  of  cash 
currently  in  circulation  in  India  prove  that  his  own  initiative  did  not  work.  Following 
demonetization,  there  were  reports  of  even  more  corruption  spurred  by  a  need  to  pay  higher 
bribes  (Bose,  2019,  p.  44) .  
Bribery  existed  before,  during,  and  after  demonetization.  Perhaps  the  method  used  to 
fight  terrorism,  black  money,  and  corruption,  was  itself  corrupt.  Talukdar  writes,  “when  the  tools 
of  cleaning  a  system  are  also  corrupted,  any  effort  at  cleansing  the  system  is  likely  to  face 
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resistance”  (Talukdar,  2016) .  Thus,  when  a  corrupt  leader  fights  a  corrupt  system  with  even  more 
corruption,  citizens  are  bound  to  resist  in  any  form.  This  is  why  demonetization  efforts  have 
worked  in  a  nearly  corruption-free  country  such  as  Sweden:  the  people  had  no  reason  to  resist.  In 
India,  corruption  is  such  a  widespread  concern  that  it  was  impossible  for  a  corrupt  leader,  whose 
party  was  not  trusted  widely,  to  fight  corruption  on  a  meta  level.  When  corruption  and  bribes 
rule,  following  the  rules  seems  fruitless  and  difficult,  resulting  in  the  chaos  seen  during 
demonetization  in  which  many  attempted  to  bend  the  rules.  When  corruption  and  bribes  are  not 
common,  trust  between  the  people  and  the  government  exists  and  rules  are  more  easily 
implemented  and  followed.  
Political  culture,  preference  for  cash,  jugaad,  and  uncertainty  avoidance  are  several 
cultural  factors  which  underlie  Indian  and  Swedish  demonetization  efforts.  Uncertainty 
avoidance  explains  how  two  very  different  cultures  respond  to  the  unknown.  This  leads  us  to 
jugaad,  an  Indian  concept  rooted  in  using  what  one  has  to  their  advantage,  even  if  that  advantage 
is  not  necessarily  legal.  Sweden  does  not  work  in  quite  the  same  way.  The  Indian  preference  for 
cash  is  understandable  given  its  unreliable  digital  infrastructure  and  attitudes  toward  keeping 
tangible  wealth.  Corruption  in  India  is  very  common  and  almost  expected  in  all  realms  of 
political  and  citizen  life,  while  Sweden  leads  the  world  with  its  low  rates  of  corruption  and 
bribery.  Swedes  trust  their  government;  they  have  not  been  given  a  reason  not  to.  Indians,  on  the 
other  hand,  tend  to  err  on  the  side  of  caution  when  it  comes  to  fully  trusting  the  government.  All 
of  these  factors  are  inextricably  connected  to  each  other  in  a  web  of  cultural  attitudes  and 
perceptions.  These  cultural  factors  clearly  pinpoint  how  Sweden  and  India  differ  and  thus  how 
they  functioned  prior  to  demonetizing,  during,  and  after.  
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2.  Economic  Factors 
While  cultural  factors  do  largely  determine  a  country’s  response  to  an  initiative  like 
demonetization,  the  event  itself  is,  at  its  core,  an  economic  issue.  India  and  Sweden  are  fairly 
different  economically.  Two  economic  factors  that  create  great  contrasts  between  India  and 
Sweden  in  terms  of  demonetization  are  the  origin  of  change  and  income  inequality.  On  one  hand, 
one  country  slowly  demonetized  over  a  period  of  time  while  the  other  demonetized  overnight 
following  a  government  decree.  One  country  is  known  for  its  equality,  though  that  record  may  be 
slipping  today,  and  the  other  is  unfortunately  known  for  its  inequality.  These  factors,  when 
applied  to  demonetization,  illustrate  how  different  India  and  Sweden  are.  
A. The  Origin  of  Change 
Sweden’s  demonetization  occurred  as  a  result  of  greater  technological  innovation  which 
spurred  the  growth  of  digital  payment  methods  and  acceptance  and  adoption  by  the  general 
population,  businesses,  and  public  services.  India’s  demonetization  was  an  order  from  the  top, 
resulting  in  chaos,  efforts  to  avoid  it,  and  change  after  change  as  an  unprepared  government 
executed  an  ill-prepared  policy  on  surprised  people.  The  factor  to  consider  here  that  sets  Sweden 
and  India’s  movements  apart  is  the  origin  of  change,  or  from  where  the  demonetization  directive 
came.  How  does  a  top-down  command  compare  to  an  initiative  started  by  the  people? 
Because  Indian  demonetization  originated  with  Prime  Minister  Modi  and  was  a  top-down 
order  from  Prime  Minister  to  the  RBI  and  the  Indian  people,  the  country  was  pushed  into  chaos 
due  to  a  lack  of  coherence  and  communication  between  government  agencies  and  actors.  One 
day,  the  bank  was  printing  Rs500  and  Rs1000  notes.  Within  hours  they  were  told  to  suspend 
printing,  recall  these  notes,  create  replacement  notes,  and  start  exchanging  them  with  the  public. 
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This  notice  from  the  top  created  immense  problems  for  all  Indians,  but  mostly  the  working  poor 
in  the  informal  and  farming  sectors.  An  initiative  that  was  better  planned  could  have  prevented 
some  of  the  problems  that  arose  following  the  demonetization  announcement,  but  the  fact  that  it 
was  an  authoritative  decree  from  Modi  deeply  affected  the  people’s  reception  of  the  event.  
Modi  is  no  stranger  to  the  title  of  authoritarian.  He  is  commonly  referred  to  as  a 
strongman  in  international  publications  and  demonetization  has  only  strengthened  that  image. 
Economist  Amartya  Sen  stated  that  demonetization  was  a  despotic  act  and  that  “only  an 
authoritarian  government  can  calmly  cause  such  misery  to  the  people.”  (Belvedere,  2017) .  It  is 
indeed  strange  that  the  government  and  specifically  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  whose  job  it  is  to 
protect  people’s  money,  suddenly  became  untrustworthy  and  the  source  of  financial  distress.  By 
appealing  to  a  variety  of  Indians  for  different  reasons,  Modi  was  able  to  reach  into  the  minds  and 
pockets  of  Indians  from  different  financial  strata.  Poor  Indians  never  had  much  cash  in  the  first 
place,  but  now  know  Modi’s  name  and  game.  Middle-class  Indians  had  been  given  a  gift:  their 
richer  or  more  corrupt  counterparts  would  now  be  finally  accountable  for  taxes  and  may  lose 
illegal  savings.  Modi  showed  his  power  by  literally  affecting  the  pocketbooks  of  every  single 
Indian  citizen,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  were  playing  by  the  rules.  His  popularity  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  hurt  by  this  initiative,  despite  its  inefficacy  (Coll,  2017) .  This  gives  more 
credence  to  the  theory  that  demonetization  was  simply  a  power  move  as  opposed  to  an  initiative 
to  truly  fight  the  sources  of  illegal  cash  hoarding.  
The  origin  of  change  being  one  man  creates  a  myriad  of  problems.  That  man  gained  even 
more  power  while  simultaneously  creating  and  perpetuating  distrust  in  the  financial  sector.  The 
RBI  lost  credibility.  A  surprised  populace  was  forced  to  reckon  with  immense  changes  and 
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completely  change  their  routines  and  lives  in  order  to  comply  with  government  regulations  that 
changed  daily.  Such  a  directive  from  the  highest  level  of  the  Indian  government  created  the 
problems  that  followed  demonetization.  
In  Sweden,  the  origin  of  change  was  the  people  and  the  market.  Upon  the  introduction  of 
credit  and  debit  cards  and  later  payment  apps,  Swedes  flocked  to  try  the  newest  technologies, 
perhaps  based  on  a  culture  which  values  innovation  and  trying  new  things.  Over  time,  the  central 
banks  followed  this  trend  by  charging  for  checks  to  be  cashed,  revamping  and  investigating  cash 
itself,  becoming  cashless  themselves,  and  eventually  investigating  the  use  of  their  own  digital 
currency,  the  e-krona.  
In  stark  contrast  to  India,  Sweden  has  not  faced  nearly  as  many  issues  implementing 
digital  payments  or  exchanging  cash.  The  fact  that  the  decision  was  made  by  the  majority  of 
people  made  it  more  likely  that  they  would  accept  and  proceed  with  the  change.  The  decision 
making  from  the  people  to  the  government,  rather  than  the  government  to  the  people,  created 
vastly  different  results  in  Sweden  and  India.  Were  India  more  prone  to  using  digital  payment 
methods  anyway,  demonetization  might  have  been  successful.  However,  given  India’s  cultural 
attitudes  and  lack  of  Internet,  smartphone,  and  bank  account  access,  demonetization  was  a  long 
way  away  from  being  a  natural  evolution.  Thus,  when  sprung  upon  the  people,  the  results 
involved  many  attempts  at  trying  to  go  around  the  law  as  well  as  a  lack  of  general  support  for  the 
movement.  
In  sum,  the  origin  of  change  regarding  demonetization  was  totally  different  in  the  cases 
of  India  and   Sweden.  As  a  result,  this  caused  major  problems  with  following  the  decree  in  India 
and  created  a  sense  of  authoritarianism  directed  at  Narendra  Modi.  The  change  in  Sweden  came 
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from  the  people  up  to  the  government.  This  democratic  change  reflects  the  attitudes  Swedes  have 
towards  the  government  and  their  democracy,  one  in  which  everything  works  for  the  people.  Had 
the  origin  of  change  in  India  been  from  the  people,  demonetization  would  have  happened 
entirely  differently.  However,  given  India’s  lack  of  infrastructure  in  certain  areas  to  fully  commit 
to  demonetization  as  well  as  cultural  attitudes  towards  corruption,  cash,  and  making  do  with 
what  one  has,  demonetization  was  highly  unlikely  to  occur  as  a  people-driven  movement. 
B. Income  Inequality  
Income  inequality  is  an  economic  factor  that  extends  to  many  different  parts  of  a 
country’s  economic  and  cultural  landscape.  Income  inequality  reveals  information  about  the 
economy  and  gender  roles.  Sweden’s  more  equal  society  can  be  linked  to  its  current  economic 
climate  in  that  many  people  are  in  the  same  proverbial  boat:  most  people  view  each  other  equally 
and  are  on  the  same  page  when  it  comes  to  finances.  This  extends  to  gender  performance  in  the 
economy.  India,  on  the  other  hand,  has  the  second-highest  rate  of  income  inequality  in  the  world, 
just  following  South  Africa  (“Gini  Coefficient  By  Country  2019,”  2019.) .  India,  too,  is  a  society 
in  which  gender  equality  remains  weak  socially  and  economically.  Income  inequality  and  the 
corresponding  social  striation  created  a  response  in  India  that  allowed  for  demonetization  in  the 
first  place  as  well  as  the  response  to  it  by  those  who  were  affected.  
First,  Sweden  and  India  could  not  be  more  different  when  it  comes  to  inequality  based  on 
income,  though  Sweden’s  income  inequality  rates  have  been  rising  in  recent  years.  This  can  be 
measured  by  using  the  Gini  index  or  Gini  coefficient,  which  is  a  measure  of  economic  inequality. 
Sweden  tops  the  world  with  one  of  the  lowest  Gini  coefficient  index  rates:  with  a  population  of 
over  10  million,  Sweden  has  a  rate  of  24.9.  In  Gini  coefficient  terms,  a  number  closer  to  0  means 
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a  nation  is  more  equal.  India’s  Gini  coefficient  is  35.2,  higher  than  Sweden,  but  a  far  cry  from  the 
most  unequal  country,  Lesotho,  at  63.2.  A  number  closer  to  100  indicates  high  rates  of  inequality 
(“Gini  Coefficient  By  Country  2019,”  2019) .  
While  Sweden’s  economic  inequality  is  relatively  low  due  to  a  substantial  social  safety 
net  and  a  more  egalitarian  system,  it  has  been  growing  due  to  the  introduction  of  regressive  tax 
reforms  on  the  wealthy  as  well  as  higher  rates  of  poverty  brought  on  by  the  acceptance  of  waves 
of  refugees  or  other  people  who  were  born  abroad.  In  fact,  Sweden  has  had  the  highest  rate  of 
income  inequality  growth  among  all  OECD  countries  and  the  proportion  of  Swedes  at  risk  of 
poverty  has  been  growing  at  one  of  the  fastest  rates  in  the  European  Union  (Nilsson,  2018) . 
Those  earning  at  the  top  have  benefitted  from  rising  house  prices  and  deregulation  of  the  stock 
market,  seeing  their  earnings  rise  by  60%,  while  those  at  the  bottom  saw  an  increase  of  only  20% 
(Mohdin,  2017) .  Those  who  were  born  in  Sweden  are  at  far  less  of  a  risk  to  fall  into  poverty  than 
their  foreign-born  peers,  at  rates  of  13%  to  nearly  one-third  of  foreign-born  Swedes  (Nilsson, 
2018) .  This  may  be  due  to  lower  education  rates,  lower  language  skills,  or  the  difficulties  that 
arise  when  integrating  into  a  very  culturally  and  ethnically  homogeneous  society  such  as 
Sweden.  Despite  growing  rates  of  income  inequality,  Sweden  still  leads  the  pack.  
As  of  2018,  Sweden  ranks  3rd  in  the  world  in  terms  of  gender  equality.  Sweden’s  parental 
leave  policy  is  the  most  generous  in  the  world,  allowing  parents  480  days  paid  leave  with  the 
birth  or  adoption  of  a  child.  In  2016,  ministerial  positions  in  the  government  were  filled  equally 
by  males  and  females  (“These  4  Nordic  countries  hold  the  secret  to  gender  equality,”  2018) .  
High  rates  of  gender  equality  have  been  directly  correlated  with  income  equality.  A  study 
by  the  World  Economic  Forum  found  that  an  increase  of  1  point  in  gender  equality  indices  is 
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positively  associated  with  increases  in  Gini  coefficient  rates  of  almost  10  points.  Gender 
inequality  affects  the  economy  with  the  wage  gap  primarily,  as  this  contributes  to  income 
inequality.  Labor  force  gender  gaps  create  earnings  inequality,  which  makes  income  inequality 
even  worse.  In  addition,  women  are  more  likely  than  men  to  work  in  lower-earning  informal 
sector  jobs  and  have  fewer  opportunities  in  terms  of  access  to  education,  health  services,  and 
financial  services  (Jain-Chandra,  2015) .  This  creates  strong  inequality  socially  and  economically.  
India  is  an  example  of  a  country  where  gender  and  income  inequality  collide  with  drastic 
results.  While  India’s  Gini  coefficient  seems  low  at  35.2,  the  data  speak  differently,  perhaps  due 
to  such  a  high  population.  In  2017,  73%  of  the  wealth  created  in  India  went  to  1%  of  the  richest 
Indians.  67  million  poor  Indians  saw  only  a  1%  growth  in  their  wealth.  Between  2000  and  2018, 
the  number  of  billionaires  in  India  rose  from  9  to  119,  with  more  projected  to  grow  in  the  future. 
In  10  years,  billionaires’  wealth  grew  ten  times,  surpassing  the  entire  budget  of  the  Indian 
government.  63  million  Indians  become  impoverished  each  year  due  to  medical  expenses.  It 
would  take  941  years  for  the  average  minimum  wage  worker  in  India  to  make  what  a  top 
executive  earns  in  one  year  (“India,”  2019) .  These  statistics  illustrate  the  stark  contrasts  that 
income  inequality  bestows  upon  average  Indians.  Gender  inequality  in  India  is  even  worse.  
India  ranked  130  out  of  146  in  2016  in  the  Gender  Inequality  Index  issued  by  the  UNDP,  and 
violence  against  women  in  India  continues  to  rise  (Jayaraman,  2017) . 
Another  index  to  look  at  is  the  Fragile  States  Index.  The  Fragile  States  Index  created  by 
the  Fund  for  Peace  measures  a  state’s  fragility  based  on  twelve  factors,  including  economic, 
political,  security,  and  social  points  that  can  indicate  a  nation’s  strength  or  weakness.  At  one  end 
of  the  spectrum,  implying  an  extremely  fragile  state  that  may  be  engaged  in  or  on  the  brink  of  a 
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civil  war,  are  countries  such  as  South  Sudan,  Somalia,  Syria,  and  Yemen.  On  the  opposite  end  are 
Nordic  countries,  including  Sweden,  and  Singapore.  A  high  score  indicates  higher  fragility,  while 
a  lower  score  indicates  more  stability.  India’s  fragility  has  increased  from  a  ranking  of   93rd  in 
2006  to  74th  in  2019.  In  2006,  their  score  was  70.4.  In  2019,  it  was  74.4.  A  higher  score 
indicates  increased  fragility.  This  trend  can  be  attributed  to  rising  income  inequality,  human 
flight  and  brain  drain  away  from  India  towards  North  America  and  Europe,  the  demographic 
pressures  that  occur  with  a  booming  population,  and  issues  with  security  and  state  legitimacy 
(Kar,  2019) .  However,  India’s  position  has  improved  slightly  since  2016,  increasing  from  70th  in 
2016  to  74th  in  2019.  Still,  in  comparison,  India  remains  a  relatively  fragile  nation  with  sharp 
rates  of  uneven  development.  Where  Sweden’s  uneven  development  indicator  score  is  1.5, 
India’s  is  6.4  (“Country  Comparison,”  n.d.) .  Internationally,  Sweden  ranks  at  the  bottom  of  the 
Fragile  States  Index  at  170th  place  out  of  178,  mostly  due  to  the  increased  pressure  refugee  and 
migrant  populations  have  had  on  the  small,  Nordic  nation  (Fragile  States  Index,  2019) .  
It  is  important  to  look  at  this  quantitative,  aggregated  data.  The  Fragile  States  Index 
allows  for  various  factors  to  be  considered  that  contribute  to  inequality.  Such  factors  collected 
over  the  years  indicate  trends  that  fully  illustrate  the  whole  picture  of  inequality.  For  example, 
Sweden’s  rise  in  the  number  of  refugees  and  internally  displaced  people  is  reflected  in  the  data 
that  correspond  to  the  rise  in  income  inequality.  While  India  on  a  whole  has  falling  rates  of 
income  inequality  versus  previous  years,  it  is  certainly  higher  there  compared  to  many  other 
nations,  especially  Sweden.  This  leads  to  increased  tensions  in  the  country.  There  is  another 
factor  in  India,  which,  though  not  necessarily  and  economic  factors,  affects  the  economy  due  to 
pervasive  cultural  ideologies.  
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Compounding  the  issues  of  economic  class  and  social  class  in  India  in  particular  is  the 
issue  of  caste.  Caste,  as  perceived  in  India,  does  not  exist  in  Sweden.  While  Sweden  does  have 
social  stratification  between  native-born  Swedes  and  foreign-born  Swedes,  the  issues  are  being 
addressed  via  government  programs  and  initiatives.  These  issues  are  new,  spawned  by  very  high 
spikes  in  refugee  migration  to  Sweden.  There  is  anti-immigrant  sentiment  in  Sweden,  but  this  is 
simply  incomparable  to  casteist  sentiments  in  Indian  society. 
The  caste  system  in  India,  while  technically  illegal  today,  has  been  practiced  by  Hindus 
for  centuries.  The  caste  system  is  a  closed  system  of  stratification,  meaning  that  a  person  is  born 
into  their  caste  and  cannot  change  it.  Meanwhile,  caste  controls  access  to  income  and  services, 
often  leaving  those  who  are  lower-caste  with  unequal  access  to  power  (Deshpande,  2010,  p.  12) . 
Caste  certainly  adds  an  element  to  income  inequality.  Dalits,  considered  the  lowest-caste 
individuals,  were  particularly  affected  by  demonetization,  as  they  make  up  a  significant  part  of 
the  informal  sector,  which  was  deeply  hurt  following  the  cancellation  of  the  Rs500  and  Rs1000 
notes.  Simultaneously  fighting  against  political  parties  pandering  to  them  for  votes  and  fighting 
against  the  system  itself,  Dalits  in  recent  years  have  had  to  fight  the  advance  of  Hindu 
nationalism  in  addition  to  their  daily  battles  for  equal  rights  (Kandasamy,  2019) .  
Between  2002  and  2012,  income  inequality  based  on  caste  rose  substantially.  It  also  rose 
within  castes,  triggering  demands  by  certain  designated  ‘forward  caste’  groups  such  as  Jats  and 
Patels  to  be  given  reservation  benefits,  the  benefits  usually  reserved  for  lower-caste  individuals 
that  ensure  equal  access  to  education  and  government  jobs.  This  is  indicative  of  competition  for 
resources,  or  in  this  case,  job  and  education  access  (Bharti,  2018,  p.  29) .  Bharti  writes  that  the 
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economic  growth  of  lower  castes  is  stable  or  declining,  and  suggests  that  fighting  economic 
inequality  in  India  may  be  a  cover  for  fighting  issues  of  caste  inequality  (2018,  p.  49).  
Thus,  India  has  to  grapple  with  the  issue  of  caste  in  addition  to  fighting  problems  with 
income  inequality.  Neither  of  these  issues  are  present  in  Sweden;  caste  is  something  uniquely 
Indian.  While  income  inequality  and  the  corresponding  social  striation  are  huge  issues  in  India, 
in  Sweden  these  issues  are  just  now  coming  to  the  fore.  Income  inequality  and  caste  shaped 
India’s  response  to  demonetization:  it  gutted  the  informal  economy  and  set  many  poor,  often 
lower-caste  individuals  back  monetarily.  Demonetization  in  Sweden  has  affected  the  elderly  and 
foreign-born,  but  their  total  economic  upheaval  has  yet  to  be  seen  and,  if  it  occurs,  it  will  likely 
be  addressed  and  corrected  by  the  Swedish  government.  Income  inequality  in  Indian  and 
Swedish  society  alternately  affected  demonetization  in  both  countries. 
3.  Comparison  1
Demonetization  in  India  and  Sweden  differed  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  How  did  they 
compare?  Only  one  factor  jumps  out:  with  increased  access  and  availability  of  technology  in 
both  countries,  demonetization  came  into  the  picture  as  a  potentially  viable  option.  Where 
Sweden  had  the  infrastructure,  digital  literacy,  and  willing  population  to  incorporate 
demonetization  into  residents  daily  life,  India  did  not.  
Demonetization,  even  partial  conversion  of  those  who  regularly  use  cash  to  become  more 
frequent  users  of  digital  payment  methods,  seems  to  be  considered  a  natural  progression  of  a 
country’s  economy.  First  comes  a  cash-based  society  and  then,  eventually,  digital  payment 
methods  rule  and  cash  is  no  longer  required.  As  evidenced  by  the  Better  than  Cash  Alliance  and 
1  Please  see  the  table  on  page  60  for  a  comparison  between  Indian  and  Swedish  demonetizations.  
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especially  members  Mastercard  and  the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation,  cashlessness  seems 
to  be  the  goal.  Their  own  person  stake  cannot  be  disregarded  and  in  a  dominantly  capitalistic 
world,  it's  not  a  surprise  that  private  corporate  interests  are  curious  to  see  how  they  can  benefit 
from  demonetization  around  the  world.  
Clearly,  the  contrasts  far  outweigh  the  comparisons,  but  this  is  to  be  expected  when 
comparing  two  countries  that  are  very  different.  Sweden  is  a  more  ethnically  homogenous 
country  with  a  long  history  of  technological  innovation  and  a  government  that  values  social 
safety  nets.  India  has  a  history  of  colonization  that  they  are  still  working  on  recovering  from 
coupled  with  tensions  that  exist  between  ethnic  groups,  castes,  and  religions.  They  are  at  two 
different  stages  of  development  and  contrasts  are  far  more  evident  than  comparisons.  Regardless, 
this  deep  dive  into  two  very  different  demonetization  efforts  in  two  different  places  for  vastly 
different  reasons  is  important  due  to  its  implications  for  future  demonetizations  in  the  future.  
V.  Implications 
The  information  ascertained  from  this  comparative  study  of  the  demonetization  efforts  in 
both  India  and  Sweden  can  be  used  as  a  way  to  ensure  that  future  demonetization  efforts  are 
different.  From  both  studies,  future  orchestrators  of  demonetization  can  understand  that  their 
efforts  must  be  well  planned  and  communicated  to  the  people.  It  must  be  rolled  out  slowly  so 
that  all  residents  understand  the  situation,  the  goals  of  the  initiative,  and  how  to  exchange  notes 
in  a  timely  manner.  Future  demonetization  efforts  must  be  inclusive  of  people  from  multiple 
aspects  of  life:  the  elderly,  illiterate,  foreign  residents,  those  living  in  poverty  and  others  who 
may  be  negatively  affected  by  a  change  to  their  regular  economic  status.  
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The  bottom  line  is  that  demonetization  or  a  cashless  society  is  not  necessarily  a  bad  idea, 
but  its  success  is  contingent  upon  a  country’s  individual  cultural  and  economic  environment.  If 
demonetization  can  truly  work  for  everyone,  it  must  not  include  a  total  elimination  of  cash  or 
non-digital  payment  methods.  Overall,  every  aspect  of  demonetization  must  be  looked  into,  from 
the  announcement,  the  size  and  design  of  the  new  notes  and  coins,  the  queueing  system  for  banks 
and  ATMs  to  the  repercussions  for  those  already  disadvantaged  and  the  effects  it  may  have  on 
local,  domestic,  and  foreign  economies  years  in  the  future.  
VI.  Conclusion 
Demonetization  is  not  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  to  drastically  changing  a  country’s 
economy-  just  because  a  few  countries  have  been  capable  of  almost  fully  demonetizing  does  not 
mean  that  it  can  be  applied  in  any  situation.  Demonetization  takes  on  the  specific  traits  of  the 
country’s  cultural  and  economic  factors,  creating  a  new  environment  that,  by  nature,  is  exclusive.  
India  had  a  demonetization  movement  that  did  not  emerge  as  a  result  of  demand,  nor  was 
it  organized  and  highly  publicized  over  a  long  period  of  time.  Indian  demonetization  was  sprung 
on  the  people  literally  overnight.  It  caused  chaos  unlike  anything  imagined  in  Sweden,  with 
people  dying  in  line,  losing  access  to  money  they  had  kept  stowed  away,  and  an  unprepared 
government  that  changed  limits  and  rules  daily  regarding  the  exchange  of  old  notes  for  new.  This 
effort  culminated  in  a  fruitless  attempt  to  convert  people  to  more  trackable  and  therefore  taxable 
forms  of  payment,  as  recently  there  has  been  an  emergence  of  cash  once  again  since  the  hype  of 
demonetization  has  died  down.  It  has  affected  the  Indian  GDP  and  economic  growth  rates,  to  the 
detriment  to  a  growing  democracy  of  over  one  billion  people.  While  it  may  have  come  from  a 
place  of  seeking  out  tax  evaders,  forfeiters,  and  black  money,  the  government  has  not  seen  the 
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necessary  results  to  justify  the  act  of  pulling  a  proverbial  economic  rug  out  from  the  feet  of 
billions,  many  of  whom  were  the  working  poor  and  were  deeply  struggling  before,  struggled 
through  without  getting  paid  from  their  informal  sector  jobs  or  dealing  with  the  rising  inflation  of 
food  costs,  and  who  may  not  have  recovered  yet  from  such  a  surprise  overnight  announcement.  
In  Sweden,  a  movement  by  the  tech  industry  in  the  form  of  digital  payment  apps  caught 
on  with  younger  folks.  It  was  supported  by  the  government,  which  viewed  cashlessness  as  a 
popular  alternative  to  physical  notes  that  leave  banks,  businesses,  and  busses  vulnerable  to  theft. 
This  spawned  a  change  at  the  banks,  which  themselves  became  largely  cashless  and  charged 
higher  amounts  for  those  wishing  to  process  deposits  or  withdrawals  in  cash  and  a  complete 
recall  and  redesign  of  physical  money  over  a  9-year  period.  The  quick  adoption  of  these  services 
could  be  attributed  to  the  immense  trust  Swedes  have  in  their  government  and  bank  officials  to 
keep  their  data  safe  coupled  with  a  culture  which  adopts  new  technology  frequently.  While 
paying  with  cards  or  apps  has  become  commonplace,  those  who  are  left  out  are  the  elderly  or 
newly-arrived  immigrants  who  may  have  trouble  using  apps  due  to  language  or  technological 
illiteracy  or  the  remnants  of  a  cash-heavy  culture  in  their  home  country.  
Culturally,  a  difference  in  uncertainty  avoidance  scores  seems  to  explain  the  vast 
difference  in  responses  to  each  country’s  demonetization  efforts:  one  is  a  culture  in  which  if 
something  is  broken,  it  must  be  fixed  per  law  while  the  other  is  one  in  which  bending  to  abuse 
the  system  is  the  status  quo.  This  led  to  the  uniquely  Indian  idea  of  jugaad,  the  concept  of 
making  do  with  what  one  has  in  any  situation,  whether  it  is  appropriate  or  not.  This  concept 
contributes  to  the  prevalence  of  corruption  and  bribery  in  India,  things  which  hardly  exist  in 
Sweden.  Indians  have  a  preference  for  cash  due  to  a  cultural  belief  that  wealth  should  be  health 
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in  tangible  things  such  as  gold  and  cash.  This  explains  both  the  prevalence  of  cash  in  Indian 
society  as  well  as  the  reversion  back  to  cash  after  demonetization  chaos  diminished.  
In  terms  of  economic  factors,  demonetization  in  Sweden  seemed  to  emerge  from  the 
people  to  the  government,  while  demonetization  in  India  has  been  interpreted  as  a  gesture  by  a 
strongman  down  to  the  people  in  an  effort  to  control  the  masses.  Additionally,  India  has  far 
greater  income  inequality  than  Sweden,  though  its  inequality  has  grown  with  the  arrival  of 
refugees  in  recent  years.  In  India,  income  inequality  is  exacerbated  by  the  caste  system, 
something  Swedish  society  does  not  have.  This  system  prevents  India  from  achieving  its  full 
potential  economically,  as  many  are  completely  prevented  from  participating  in  certain  areas  of 
society,  thus  inhibiting  growth  economically  in  a  way  that  Sweden  will  not  experience.  
While  similar  in  the  fact  that  they  both  revamped  their  currency  and  cancelled  old 
banknotes,  India  and  Sweden’s  demonetization  efforts  had  drastically  different  catalysts, 
implementations,  responses,  and  results.  Due  to  various  economic  and  cultural  factors,  not  to 
mention  basic  political  and  demographic  differences,  India  and  Sweden  differed  in  regards  to 
demonetization.  Both  events  have  had  unsavory  effects  on  some  members  of  the  communities 
who  may  already  be  socially  disadvantaged.  Through  the  comparison  of  these  two  cases  of 
demonetization,  the  underpinnings  of  what  made  each  case  successful  may  be  understood  and 
studied  in  hopes  that  future  demonetizations  can  be  collaborative,  inclusive,  well-planned,  and 
beneficial.  
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Table  1:  Comparing  factors  which  differentiate  Indian  and  Swedish  demonetization  efforts 
 Origins  Impacts 
Cultural  Economic Cultural  Economic 
India Jugaad-  a  societal  need  and 
expectation  to  adapt  and 
innovate  affected  India’s 
implementation  of 
demonetization  and 
responses 
 
Political  culture-  bribery  and 
corruption  are  high,  causing 
distrust  in  the  government 
 
Uncertainty  Avoidance-  a 
medium  low  score  implies 
high  tolerance  for  the 
unexpected  and  likelihood 
of  adopting  new  technology  
Origin  of  Change-  an 
authoritarian,  top-down 
decision  caused 
widespread  confusion  and 
chaos 
 
Income  inequality- 
correcting  high  income 
inequality  was  later 
deemed  a  reason  behind 
demonetization  
 
 
Uncertainty  Avoidance- 
medium  low  score  allowed 
for  many  to  skirt  around  the 
rules  of  demonetization, 
forcing  the  government  to 
implement  rule  changes 
frequently 
 
Jugaad-  many  “made  do” 
with  what  they  had;  also 
seen  in  bank  lines  as  people 
adapted  to  waiting  for  hours 
to  exchange  cash 
 
Preference  for  cash- 
hoarding  of  legal  Rs100 
notes  skyrocketed  following 
the  announcement;  cash 
levels  rose 
post-demonetization  
 
Political  culture-  high  rates 
of  corruption  and  bribery  are 
commonplace  
 
Income  inequality- 
high  and  growing, 
causes  tensions 
between  groups, 
especially  those 
employed 
informally 
Sweden Uncertainty  Avoidance-  a 
low  score  implies  a  relaxed 
attitude  and  high  adoption 
of  new  technology  as  well 
as  a  willingness  to  adapt 
laws  if  they  do  not  function 
properly 
 
Political  culture-  low 
instances  of  corruption  and 
bribery  create  an 
environment  of  political 
trust  
 
Origin  of  Change-  a 
market-based  initiative  to 
use  digital  payment 
methods  was  eventually 
adopted  by  the  people  and 
then  the  banks  and 
government 
Uncertainty  Avoidance-  a 
low  score  allowed  for 
widespread  adoption  of 
technology,  mainly  digital 
payment  methods 
 
Political  Culture-  very  low 
levels  of  corruption  and 
bribery  fostered  acceptance 
of  demonetization  and 
responses  to  it 
Income  inequality- 
low,  but  growing. 
Caused  some  groups 
to  be  left  behind 
following 
demonetization 
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